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Message-Id: <DIZLR1S1UFXC.1CL0O1X3GAEZ9@redcoat.dev>
Date: Wed, 03 Jun 2026 18:49:23 +0100
From: "Emily Shepherd" <emily@...coat.dev>
To: <oss-security@...ts.openwall.com>, <jcb62281@...il.com>
Subject: Re: Linux kernel TLS ULP use-after-free in
tls_sk_proto_close()
On Wed Jun 3, 2026 at 10:16 AM BST, Oleg Sevostyanov wrote:
> Thank you for the comments.
>
> You are right about the reproducer. I mistakenly included it despite saying
> that I was not including it. I apologize for the inconsistency.
This reads like AI. Given the original mistake in publicly submitting
a PoC when you intended not to, I have to ask: is a human properly
checking the contents of the emails you are sending?
> I also agree that taking lock_sock(sk) earlier in tls_sk_proto_close()
> looks
> like the natural mitigation direction, given that the function takes it
> unconditionally anyway. I will bring this point to the kernel/networking
> maintainers when discussing a fix.
Can you clarify if this has been raised on the appropriate kernel
mailing lists? I do not see it in your timeline:
On Tues Jun 2, 2026 at 20:59 AM BST, Oleg Sevostyanov wrote:
> Timeline:
> 2026-05-16: Reported to linux-distros
> 2026-05-30: Latest agreed public disclosure date
> 2026-06-02: Public disclosure to oss-security
Emily
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