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Message-ID: <dbf738ce-d236-4c8b-864d-900d4e7c3238@rub.de> Date: Fri, 27 Sep 2024 14:49:00 +0200 From: Fabian Bäumer <fabian.baeumer@....de> To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com Subject: Re: CVE-2024-40761: Apache Answer: Avatar URL leaked user email addresses > I don't think that a seeded PRF (with a per-server seed) would meet > the requirements here. I think you are right. When I wrote my response yesterday I wasn't fully aware how Gravatar is supposed to be used. I always thought of Gravatar as a service to generate unique avatar images. Now, this leaves me with a few observations: 1. The 'should be taken' from Gravatar's documentation should be 'must be taken' to ensure consistent user hashes (therefore using MD5 in the first place rendered Gravatar useless if Gravatar doesn't match against MD5 hashes as well). 2. The information leakage with Gravatar is in-spec. Fixing the information leakage would be possible but requires changes on Gravatar's side by implementing a symmetric cipher instead of a hash (as suggested; a hash wouldn't be tractable any more because Gravatar would need to hash every user's email address with every registered seed when using seeded PRF). Prior hashing wouldn't even be required given that both sides - Gravatar and the site itself - have access to the user's email address anyway. 3. It may be advisable to not use Gravatar as the default (not sure if this is the case here). Instead, let user's choose it and let them know about the potential information leakage. 4. The fix does not fix what it tries to fix. 5. Assigning a CVE for an in-spec information leakage seems not useful to me. Otherwise, every single product using Gravatar would be affected by this. M. Sc. Fabian Bäumer Chair for Network and Data Security Ruhr University Bochum Universitätsstr. 150, Building MC 4/145 44780 Bochum Germany Am 27.09.2024 um 14:25 schrieb Alexander Patrakov: > On Thu, Sep 26, 2024 at 5:19 AM Demi Marie Obenour > <demi@...isiblethingslab.com> wrote: >> On Wed, Sep 25, 2024 at 06:28:16AM +0000, Enxin Xie wrote: >>> Severity: low >>> >>> Affected versions: >>> >>> - Apache Answer through 1.3.5 >>> >>> Description: >>> >>> Inadequate Encryption Strength vulnerability in Apache Answer. >>> >>> This issue affects Apache Answer: through 1.3.5. >>> >>> Using the MD5 value of a user's email to access Gravatar is insecure and can lead to the leakage of user email. The official recommendation is to use SHA256 instead. >>> Users are recommended to upgrade to version 1.4.0, which fixes the issue. >>> >>> Credit: >>> >>> 张岳熙 (reporter) >>> >>> References: >>> >>> https://answer.incubator.apache.org >>> https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-40761 >> What is the specific property of SHA256 required here? Email addresses >> have low entropy and I suspect they can be easily brute-forced, so >> leaking the SHA256 has is still bad. Instead, I would use a seeded PRF >> with a seed only known to the server, ensuring that the resulting value >> does not leak any information about the email. >> -- >> Sincerely, >> Demi Marie Obenour (she/her/hers) >> Invisible Things Lab > I don't think that a seeded PRF (with a per-server seed) would meet > the requirements here. The problem is that Gravatar would have no way > of understanding which email is in question. Indeed, that would > require storing all emails hashed with all registered server seeds. > > What would work is an email hash encrypted symmetrically with a > per-server key. Then Gravatar (who also knows this key) would decrypt > the email hash and look up the avatar image. > > Note that all of the above talks about a hypothetical improved version > of Gravatar, not what we have right now. > Content of type "text/html" skipped Download attachment "smime.p7s" of type "application/pkcs7-signature" (6214 bytes)
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