|
Message-ID: <CAJ_zFkJZ1E-Wsrp92mvHL6TFmChPECbRsN+JGngqENKHCmALAA@mail.gmail.com> Date: Tue, 9 Oct 2018 10:11:34 -0700 From: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@...gle.com> To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com Subject: Re: ghostscript: bypassing executeonly to escape -dSAFER sandbox (CVE-2018-17961) On Tue, Oct 9, 2018 at 9:53 AM Leonid Isaev <leonid.isaev@...a.colorado.edu> wrote: > On Tue, Oct 09, 2018 at 06:58:39AM -0700, Tavis Ormandy wrote: > > Full working exploit that works in the last few versions is attached, > > viewing it in evince, imagemagick, gimp, okular, etc should add a line to > > ~/.bashrc. > > Add zathura to the above list :) > > > p.s. plz can we deprecate untrusted postscript :( > > Which means any postscript file downloaded from the internet... Then how > should > people read arXiv.org, for example? I think we should encourage switching to other document formats that we have a better handle on securing. If you do need untrusted ps, I think treating it the same as shell script file you downloaded from the internet. I mean, technically there's a bash restricted mode and python rexec, but you probably wouldn't run it on random things you just downloaded. gs -dSAFER and bash -r are useful features, but I think ever invoking them automatically without prompts about trust, etc, is just asking for trouble. Tavis.
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Please check out the Open Source Software Security Wiki, which is counterpart to this mailing list.
Confused about mailing lists and their use? Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia and check out these guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.