[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20150330150021.GB23696@suse.de>
Date: Mon, 30 Mar 2015 17:00:21 +0200
From: Sebastian Krahmer <krahmer@...e.de>
To: cve-assign@...re.org
Cc: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: CVS-Request: realmd code execution/auth bypass
On Wed, Mar 25, 2015 at 04:36:52PM -0400, cve-assign@...re.org wrote:
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA1
>
> > Upstream has opened two bugs for issues in realmd
>
> This initial response has a CVE ID only for the second one.
>
> > could lead to remote attackers logging into the local system
> > by placing an evil AD server in the LAN
> > https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=89205
>
> Is upstream planning to announce this as a vulnerability fix? Although
> the old behavior was unsafe if there was any possibility of an
> untrusted device on the LAN, it appears that the old behavior had been
> intentional. For example, the old behavior may have been chosen as a
> security/convenience tradeoff. This example might be applicable:
>
> https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/QA:Testcase_realmd_join_automatic
>
Are CVE's only assigned if upstream is issuing fixes? The bug
entry reads like that there is something that needs fixing:
Attackers can pose as a legit realm (with the same name) so the admin is tricked to
join to a rogue AD, allowing an attacker to log into the machine.
The admin has no chance to know that he joined an evil AD which
has hijacked his legit realm-name.
Even when its intentional that the join is automatic for convenience,
it should "somehow" be ensured that the legit AD servers are used.
Sebastian
--
~ perl self.pl
~ $_='print"\$_=\47$_\47;eval"';eval
~ krahmer@...e.de - SuSE Security Team
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Please check out the
Open Source Software Security Wiki, which is counterpart to this
mailing list.
Confused about mailing lists and their use?
Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia
and check out these
guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.
