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Message-Id: <20150330180044.1EB0F42E028@smtpvbsrv1.mitre.org> Date: Mon, 30 Mar 2015 14:00:44 -0400 (EDT) From: cve-assign@...re.org To: krahmer@...e.de Cc: cve-assign@...re.org, oss-security@...ts.openwall.com Subject: Re: CVS-Request: realmd code execution/auth bypass -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 The availability of new software from upstream doesn't determine whether a CVE ID can be assigned. If the old software had a behavior that matched the documentation and was consistent with a possibly useful security model, then typically no CVE ID is assigned when a vendor chooses to announce a cutover to a different security model. > it should "somehow" be ensured that the legit AD servers are used. A possibly intended use case is network environments that do not have any untrusted devices and do not have any rogue ADs. To the extent that the product is used on arbitrary networks, many types of improvements might be helpful. For example, apparently the default is to use a realm name sent by a DHCP server. One might argue that an improvement would be dropping DHCP support on the basis that it's an unsafe way to determine a realm name. Or, one might argue that the realm-name string should be displayed to the client user for confirmation before proceeding. We don't necessarily want to have CVEs for these types of improvements. The automatic-join issue is more of a borderline issue but may be best categorized as a natural evolution of a security model for a better match with real-life use cases and real-life threats. - -- CVE assignment team, MITRE CVE Numbering Authority M/S M300 202 Burlington Road, Bedford, MA 01730 USA [ PGP key available through http://cve.mitre.org/cve/request_id.html ] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.14 (SunOS) iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJVGY6EAAoJEKllVAevmvmsbkQH/R9UUBJ5q0zGJzOUdL4i4E3a ZMk15+zBbvKov5NSYFFNL1TI5O9TlVHZFWb9NZoasnHb4RcFlv3byelYOGNRTdLD rJNnD7Jy7bnIwrniKe/gb7DnKfbLIeB4BarjKPRbBz3O7zWYYhLJArdod62PgD0i bBkQsJgIAPR0Rlb29zYKvrWBpAtxSI1KE4lJKH6/JxCWOXy23BG5aBDlEF4oGmSR 8hyJ2ZKRw1gEmdeSH8E1TUkbYukADf8GANC2AEqRiHNtAwjJRkkMWQuTzPjzHCZU yldzKONImW9CXMAnWpNGBonQ2+FWhalQePLdumkFwTAsfG1CMrQK0EKN+aCiEXQ= =zxlx -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
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