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Message-ID: <20130314063259.GA29394@gremlin.ru>
Date: Thu, 14 Mar 2013 10:32:59 +0400
From: gremlin@...mlin.ru
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: Linux kernel + devtmpfs automount == insecure /dev/{,u}random mode
On 13-Mar-2013 15:54:15 +0400, gremlin@...mlin.ru wrote:
>> http://lkml.indiana.edu/hypermail/linux/kernel/0012.2/0502.html
> Yes, I've found that while investigating the possible impact. Also,
> the random.c doesn't use the data directly, but instead hashes it.
And that has some impact: the malicious (or just curious) unprivileged
user may run flood the devices with garbage, and the kernel will spend
resources hashing it.
Try this: `dd bs=1M if=/dev/zero of=/dev/urandom`
On a Core i5-2400 3.10GHz CPU, only 16 processes running for several
minutes result in all cores loaded at 99% and the load average of 20.
My workstation has survived the experiment, but heavy-loaded servers
may dislike that :-)
> But my opinion stays exactly the same: devices should be 0644, and
> only trusted random data sources should be used to add entropy to
> the pool via add_device_randomness().
> So, I'll just restrict the access to /dev/{,u}random locally :-)
... and recommend others do the same.
--
Alexey V. Vissarionov aka Gremlin from Kremlin <gremlin ПРИ gremlin ТЧК ru>
GPG key ID: 0xEF3B1FA8, keyserver: hkp://subkeys.pgp.net
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