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Message-ID: <50611172.2010409@slackware.com>
Date: Mon, 24 Sep 2012 21:05:38 -0500
From: "Patrick J. Volkerding" <security@...ckware.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: Re: Re: CVE request(?): gpg: improper file permssions
set when en/de-crypting files
On 09/24/2012 12:13 PM, Michael Gilbert wrote:
> In addition,
> piping would need to be permissions-aware to achieve the following:
>
> $ umask 077
> $ touch sensitive-file
> $ umask 022
> $ cat sensitive-file > sensitive-file2
> $ ls -l sensitive-file*
> -rw------- 1 a a 0 Sep 24 13:09 sensitive-file
> -rw------- 1 a a 0 Sep 24 13:09 sensitive-file2
Piping is already permissions aware. It uses the umask. IMO, any
attempt to add another check in the shell to make a newly created file
retain the permissions of whatever input it was derived from would be a
misguided effort, and likely to cause breakage. Any script that cares
about this should already be controlling the permissions through the
umask, and having the output file's access created in a way that does
not respect the umask could be an unwelcome surprise.
Pat
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