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Message-ID: <50526F94.9050204@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 13 Sep 2012 17:43:16 -0600
From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
CC: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@...xchg8b.com>
Subject: Re: Re: note on gnome shell extensions
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On 09/13/2012 11:59 AM, Tavis Ormandy wrote:
> Vincent Danen <vdanen@...hat.com> wrote:
>
>> * [2012-09-13 18:03:33 +0200] Marcus Meissner wrote:
>>
>>> On Thu, Sep 13, 2012 at 05:39:57PM +0200, Tavis Ormandy wrote:
>>>> On Mon, Sep 10, 2012 at 02:48:38PM -0600, Vincent Danen
>>>> wrote:
>>>>> * [2012-09-08 18:14:10 -0600] Kurt Seifried wrote: SUSE has
>>>>> some interesting info in their bug:
>>>>>
>>>>> https://bugzilla.novell.com/show_bug.cgi?id=779473#c4
>>>>>
>>>>> By the sounds of it, this should be harmless. Vincent Untz
>>>>> says that the browser plugin doesn't actually install the
>>>>> extensions, it's passed to another process via a dbus call
>>>>> to gnome-shell, which sends the uuid of the extension to
>>>>> the extensions.gnome.org web site in order to download the
>>>>> extension.
>>>>>
>>>>> See:
>>>>>
>>>>> http://git.gnome.org/browse/gnome-shell/tree/js/ui/shellDBus.js#n305
>>>>>
>
>>>>>
http://git.gnome.org/browse/gnome-shell/tree/js/ui/extensionDownloader.js#n27
>>>>>
>>>>> which is:
>>>>>
>>>>> let message = Soup.form_request_new_from_hash('GET',
>>>>> REPOSITORY_URL_INFO, params);
>>>>>
>>>>> And REPOSITORY_URL_INFO is hardcoded earlier:
>>>>>
>>>>> const REPOSITORY_URL_BASE = 'https://extensions.gnome.org';
>>>>> const REPOSITORY_URL_DOWNLOAD = REPOSITORY_URL_BASE +
>>>>> '/download-extension/%s.shell-extension.zip'; const
>>>>> REPOSITORY_URL_INFO = REPOSITORY_URL_BASE +
>>>>> '/extension-info/'; const REPOSITORY_URL_UPDATE =
>>>>> REPOSITORY_URL_BASE + '/update-info/';
>>>>>
>>>>> I don't think this is something that can be exploited,
>>>>> based on the above.
>>>>
>>>> Not sure I follow the logic, can't I just upload something
>>>> malicious to extensions.gnome.org and then force you to
>>>> download it? I mean, I can try it if you're not convinced
>>>> it's possible.
>>>
>>> There are supposed to be reviewers before it gets activated,
>>> but exactly this concern Sebastian also voiced.
>>>
>>>> They surely do not have a magical technique for determining
>>>> if my code is or can become malicious.
>>>
>>> Exactly.
>>
>> Yeah, this is definitely a possibility, but could happen
>> regardless of this with some social engineering (hey, download my
>> cool foo extension!) and have something malicious up there. This
>> is pretty much the same thing, just making it easier.
>
> Well, no. This is like saying it's pointless to patch
> vulnerabilities, because I can just make you download malware. You
> can't just make me download malware, because I know how to make
> trust decisions.
>
> You could make me download a malicious gnome extension, because you
> can do so without interaction or my consent.
>
>> It's not much different than having a malicious app in the
>> iTunes/Android/Whatever app store. The flaw there isn't so much
>> in the app store, but the app. Wouldn't the same thought apply
>> here?
>>
>
> I've uploaded my malicious android app, how do I make you install
> it?
>
> I can create http://foo.com/malware.rpm, that's clearly not a
> vulnerability and working as designed. But if I can force you to
> download and install it without you having the opportunity to make
> a trust decision, that clearly is a vulnerability.
>
> Do you agree that I can upload something malicious to
> extensions.gnome.org?
>
> Do you agree that I can make you install it without consent,
> interaction, or the opportunity to make a trust decision?
>
> If so, then I don't understand the objection :-)
>
> Tavis.
Please use CVE-2012-4427 for this issue.
- --
Kurt Seifried Red Hat Security Response Team (SRT)
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