Follow @Openwall on Twitter for new release announcements and other news
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <116504736.33630970.1347447312661.JavaMail.root@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 12 Sep 2012 06:55:12 -0400 (EDT)
From: Jan Lieskovsky <jlieskov@...hat.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Cc: "Steven M. Christey" <coley@...us.mitre.org>,
        Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>,
        Oracle Security Team <secalert_us@...cle.com>,
        David Jorm <djorm@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: CVE Request (minor) -- JVM: heap memory
 disclosure (possibly various JDKs)

Hello Steve,

  thank you for the clarification.

> Jan/Kurt,
> 
> The bug report appears to be describing a narrow class of vulnerability 
> that could affect multiple codebases that implement Java Virtual Machines, 
> not just Oracle's;

That's true, my yesterday's request was too wide, because in that moment we were
not sure yet, which concrete JVM implementations would be affected by this
deficiency (and which not).

> if so, then a separate CVE would be needed for each 
> REPORTED codebase, and CVE-2012-4416 is ONLY for bug id 7196857 for the 
> Oracle-supported JVM.

Anyway, upon David's review (Cc-ed too) we can announce that this problem would
affect / is specific only to Oracle Java SE 7 (java-1.7.0-oracle), and
Java SE 7 as provided by OpenJDK 7 (java-1.7.0-openjdk).

So after above suggestion we will use CVE-2012-4416 for Oracle's codebase /
Oracle supported JVM and the OpenJDK one should obtain another CVE identifier.

I will clarify this situation in our bugs too yet.

Kurt, could you allocate another CVE id then for the OpenJDK part of the
story?

> 
> I wonder about the severity of the issue, but given the possibility that 
> applications might access an array before a fill, and applications may 
> depend on there being "empty" elements after initialization, this seems 
> reasonable for a CVE.

Florian clarified on this already (why to assign CVE id for these is appropriate
approach).

Thank you && Regards, Jan.
--
Jan iankko Lieskovsky / Red Hat Security Response Team

> 
> - Steve

Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Please check out the Open Source Software Security Wiki, which is counterpart to this mailing list.

Confused about mailing lists and their use? Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia and check out these guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.