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Message-Id: <201003111620.49171.ludwig.nussel@suse.de>
Date: Thu, 11 Mar 2010 16:20:48 +0100
From: Ludwig Nussel <ludwig.nussel@...e.de>
To: Brian Stafford <brian@...fford.uklinux.net>
Cc: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com, libesmtp@...fford.uklinux.net,
security@...ntu.com
Subject: Re: CVE Request: libesmtp does not check NULL bytes in commonName
Brian Stafford wrote:
> [...]
> I find myself coming back to RFC 2818 being a reasonable choice since it
> is flexible and (almost) clear, and since HTTPS, as a major user of TLS,
> is, I assume, well analysed for security implications wrt certificate
> validation.
More fun:
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=159483
> Is it the case that for STARTTLS in SMTP what we are really interested
> in is encrypting the data on the wire and authentication is only of
> secondary importance?
Encryption without authentication makes you prone to MITM.
> Do we know what the best current practice is
> among CAs when it comes to issuing certificates for STARTTLS?
The most common implementation is to just allow the simple form
*.something so I'd assume that other patterns are rare in the wild.
The last commenter in the aforementioned Mozilla bug says that
*.*.appspot.com is actually used by Google though.
Anyways, the matching function in libesmtp certainly is good enough.
I was just surprised that wildcards at the right hand side are
allowed. What about the actual patch I sent though? :-)
cu
Ludwig
--
(o_ Ludwig Nussel
//\
V_/_ http://www.suse.de/
SUSE LINUX Products GmbH, GF: Markus Rex, HRB 16746 (AG Nuernberg)
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