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Message-ID: <2359eed20905071042v2dd4be46k25d79eb35dded92@mail.gmail.com> Date: Thu, 7 May 2009 12:42:27 -0500 From: Will Drewry <redpig@...rt.org> To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com, bugtraq@...urityfocus.com, ocert-announce@...ts.ocert.org Subject: [oCERT-2009-001] Pango integer overflow in heap allocation size calculations #2009-001 Pango integer overflow in heap allocation size calculations Description: Pango is a library for laying out and rendering text, with an emphasis on internationalization. Pango suffers from a multiplicative integer overflow which may lead to a potentially exploitable, heap overflow depending on the calling conditions. For example, this vulnerability is remotely reachable in Firefox by creating an overly large document.location value but only results in a process-terminating, allocation error (denial of service). The affected function is pango_glyph_string_set_size. An overflow check when doubling the size neglects the overflow possible on the subsequent allocation: string->glyphs = g_realloc (string->glyphs, string->space * sizeof (PangoGlyphInfo)); Note that other font rendering subsystems suffer from similar issues and should be cross-checked by maintainers. Affected version: Pango < 1.24 Fixed version: Pango >= 1.24 (check with your package maintainer for backports) Credit: Will Drewry, oCERT Team | Google Security Team. Special thanks to Karl Tomlinson for extended analysis of the impact on Firefox. CVE: CVE-2009-1194 Timeline: 2009-02-22: attempted to contact upstream via gtk-i18n-list@...me.org 2009-02-25: bug filed with Mozilla against firefox 2009-03-02: Behdad Esfahbod patched Pango upstream for 1.24 2009-04-13: vendor-sec alerted regarding backporting the silent pango fix 2009-04-23: embargo date and CVE assigned (thanks Josh Bressers!) 2009-05-07: advisory released References: http://www.pango.org/ https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=480134 Links: http://www.mozilla.org/firefox Permalink: http://www.ocert.org/advisories/ocert-2009-001.html -- Will Drewry <redpig@...rt.org> oCERT Team :: http://ocert.org
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