kernel-hardening mailing list - 2016/06/24

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kernel-hardening mailing list - 2016/06/24

Re: [PATCH v7 0/9] x86/mm: memory area address KASLR (Jason Cooper <jason@...edaemon.net>)
[PATCH v4 00/16] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
[PATCH v4 01/16] bluetooth: Switch SMP to crypto_cipher_encrypt_one() (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
[PATCH v4 02/16] rxrpc: Avoid using stack memory in SG lists in rxkad (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
[PATCH v4 03/16] x86/mm/hotplug: Don't remove PGD entries in remove_pagetable() (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
[PATCH v4 04/16] x86/cpa: In populate_pgd, don't set the pgd entry until it's populated (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
[PATCH v4 05/16] x86/mm: Remove kernel_unmap_pages_in_pgd() and efi_cleanup_page_tables() (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
[PATCH v4 06/16] mm: Track NR_KERNEL_STACK in KiB instead of number of stacks (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
[PATCH v4 07/16] mm: Fix memcg stack accounting for sub-page stacks (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
[PATCH v4 08/16] dma-api: Teach the "DMA-from-stack" check about vmapped stacks (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
[PATCH v4 09/16] fork: Add generic vmalloced stack support (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
[PATCH v4 15/16] x86/mm/64: Enable vmapped stacks (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
[PATCH v4 10/16] x86/die: Don't try to recover from an OOPS on a non-default stack (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
[PATCH v4 11/16] x86/dumpstack: When OOPSing, rewind the stack before do_exit (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
[PATCH v4 13/16] x86/dumpstack: Try harder to get a call trace on stack overflow (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
[PATCH v4 12/16] x86/dumpstack: When dumping stack bytes due to OOPS, start with regs->sp (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
[PATCH v4 14/16] x86/dumpstack/64: Handle faults when printing the "Stack:" part of an OOPS (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
[PATCH v4 16/16] x86/mm: Improve stack-overflow #PF handling (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) (Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>)
Re: [PATCH v4 01/16] bluetooth: Switch SMP to crypto_cipher_encrypt_one() (Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>)
Re: [PATCH v4 01/16] bluetooth: Switch SMP to crypto_cipher_encrypt_one() (Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH v7 0/9] x86/mm: memory area address KASLR (Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>)
Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) (Michal Hocko <mhocko@...nel.org>)
Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) (Michal Hocko <mhocko@...nel.org>)
Re: [PATCH v4 06/16] mm: Track NR_KERNEL_STACK in KiB instead of number of stacks (Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>)
Re: [PATCH v4 07/16] mm: Fix memcg stack accounting for sub-page stacks (Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>)
Re: [PATCH v4 11/16] x86/dumpstack: When OOPSing, rewind the stack before do_exit (Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>)
Re: [PATCH v4 12/16] x86/dumpstack: When dumping stack bytes due to OOPS, start with regs->sp (Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>)
Re: [PATCH v4 13/16] x86/dumpstack: Try harder to get a call trace on stack overflow (Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>)
Re: [PATCH v4 14/16] x86/dumpstack/64: Handle faults when printing the "Stack:" part of an OOPS (Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>)
Re: [PATCH v4 11/16] x86/dumpstack: When OOPSing, rewind the stack before do_exit (Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>)
devicetree random-seed properties, was: "Re: [PATCH v7 0/9] x86/mm: memory area address KASLR" (Jason Cooper <jason@...edaemon.net>)
Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) (Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>)
Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) (Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>)
Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) (Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>)
Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) (Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>)
Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) (Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>)
Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
Re: devicetree random-seed properties, was: "Re: [PATCH v7 0/9] x86/mm: memory area address KASLR" (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) (Brian Gerst <brgerst@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH v4 11/16] x86/dumpstack: When OOPSing, rewind the stack before do_exit (Brian Gerst <brgerst@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) (Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>)
Re: devicetree random-seed properties, was: "Re: [PATCH v7 0/9] x86/mm: memory area address KASLR" (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) (Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>)
Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
Re: [RFC][PATCH v2 6/4] mm: disallow user copy to/from separately allocated pages (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [RFC][PATCH v2 6/4] mm: disallow user copy to/from separately allocated pages (Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>)
Re: [RFC][PATCH v2 6/4] mm: disallow user copy to/from separately allocated pages (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) (Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>)
Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) (Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>)
Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) (Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>)
Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)

54 messages

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