kernel-hardening mailing list - 2016/06/17

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kernel-hardening mailing list - 2016/06/17

Re: [RFC][PATCH v2 0/4] mm: Hardened usercopy (Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu)
Re: Initialising random(4) (Sandy Harris <sandyinchina@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
Re: [PATCH 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) (Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@...ibm.com>)
Re: [RFC v1 3/4] x86, boot: Implement ASLR for kernel memory sections (x86_64) (Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>)
Re: [RFC v1 3/4] x86, boot: Implement ASLR for kernel memory sections (x86_64) (Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>)
Re: [RFC v1 3/4] x86, boot: Implement ASLR for kernel memory sections (x86_64) (Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>)
Re: [PATCH 2/2] security,perf: Allow further restriction of perf_event_open (Ben Hutchings <ben@...adent.org.uk>)
Re: [PATCH 2/2] security,perf: Allow further restriction of perf_event_open (Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@...ux.intel.com>)
Re: [PATCH 2/2] security,perf: Allow further restriction of perf_event_open (Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>)
Re: Re: [PATCH 2/2] security,perf: Allow further restriction of perf_event_open (Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH 2/2] security,perf: Allow further restriction of perf_event_open (Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
[PATCH v2 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
[PATCH v2 01/13] x86/mm/hotplug: Don't remove PGD entries in remove_pagetable() (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
[PATCH v2 02/13] x86/cpa: In populate_pgd, don't set the pgd entry until it's populated (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
[PATCH v2 03/13] x86/cpa: Warn if kernel_unmap_pages_in_pgd is used inappropriately (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
[PATCH v2 05/13] mm: Move memcg stack accounting to account_kernel_stack (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
[PATCH v2 07/13] x86/die: Don't try to recover from an OOPS on a non-default stack (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
[PATCH v2 06/13] fork: Add generic vmalloced stack support (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
[PATCH v2 04/13] mm: Track NR_KERNEL_STACK in KiB instead of number of stacks (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
[PATCH v2 08/13] x86/dumpstack: When OOPSing, rewind the stack before do_exit (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
[PATCH v2 09/13] x86/dumpstack: When dumping stack bytes due to OOPS, start with regs->sp (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
[PATCH v2 10/13] x86/dumpstack: Try harder to get a call trace on stack overflow (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
[PATCH v2 11/13] x86/dumpstack/64: Handle faults when printing the "Stack:" part of an OOPS (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
[PATCH v2 12/13] x86/mm/64: Enable vmapped stacks (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
[PATCH v2 13/13] x86/mm: Improve stack-overflow #PF handling (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
Re: [PATCH 2/2] security,perf: Allow further restriction of perf_event_open (Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...nel.org>)
Re: [PATCH v2 03/13] x86/cpa: Warn if kernel_unmap_pages_in_pgd is used inappropriately (Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>)
Re: [PATCH v2 05/13] mm: Move memcg stack accounting to account_kernel_stack (Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>)
Re: [PATCH v2 06/13] fork: Add generic vmalloced stack support (Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>)
Re: [PATCH v2 05/13] mm: Move memcg stack accounting to account_kernel_stack (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
Re: [PATCH v2 06/13] fork: Add generic vmalloced stack support (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)

33 messages

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