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Message-ID: <309114f1-a679-4ad9-b802-7b9e6c038e4e@gmail.com> Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2026 19:14:15 -0600 From: Jacob Bachmeyer <jcb62281@...il.com> To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com, Solar Designer <solar@...nwall.com> Subject: Re: "sshole": password authentication bypass: OpenSSH + musl libc On 11/16/26 01:34, Solar Designer wrote: > [...] > > Besides the risk of crashes on NULL dereference, I also worry that in > some wrappers and scripting languages NULL may be mapped to an empty > string or (more reasonably) to a non-object. I am seeing the latter > when I call crypt() from Perl on Rocky Linux 9 and 10. If I check with > defined(), it is not. But if I blindly use it as a string, it's empty. That is because Perl's undefined value coerces to an empty string and/or the number zero, with a "Use of uninitialized value" warning if warnings are enabled. (This is part of the reason you should always put "use strict; use warnings;" at the top of every file of Perl code.) Since both of those are also Boolean false in Perl, the undefined value is accepted (without a warning) as a false value in Boolean contexts. > If this happens when setting a new password, the empty string could be > blindly put into a password hash field. That could be later interpreted > as the user having no password (the traditional Unix behavior for empty > password hash field) or if it's passed into Perl's crypt() as the salt > then we'll get a non-object again, which may behave like an empty string > again and the two may match. That would mean successful authentication > with no/empty or with any password, regardless of the intended password. Correction: *will* behave like an empty string in Perl. This is the documented behavior; see "Declarations" in perlsyn. > I suspect this sort of problem is not limited to Perl. It may also not > be limited to treatment of non-objects as empty strings - they could > also be stored as-is and then passed back into crypt() and used in a > comparison, possibly resulting in a match between two non-objects. I suspect that this is an example of a more general problem of programmers being unaware of edge cases. You seem to have been unaware of the documented behavior---how many other programmers have similar "blind spots" and how much code is waiting to break as a result? -- Jacob
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