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Message-ID: <10ea58b5-3b2b-44b7-a5bb-5f06c356e9fe@gmail.com> Date: Tue, 18 Mar 2025 20:32:19 -0500 From: Jacob Bachmeyer <jcb62281@...il.com> To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com, Mark Esler <mark.esler@...inguard.dev> Subject: Re: tj-action/changed-files GitHub action was compromised On 3/15/25 14:03, Mark Esler wrote: > On March 14 2025 at 16:57:45 UTC the tj-action/changed-files GitHub action was > compromised with commit 0e58ed8 ("chore(deps): lock file maintenance (#2460)"). > This commit was added to all 361 tagged versions of the GitHub action. This > malicious commit results in a script that can leak CI/CD secrets from runner > memory. > > [...] How the attacker got the commit into the tj-action/changed-files namespace seems obvious (GitHub uses a common storage pool for a repository and its forks; an attacker need only fork a repository and push the malicious commit to his own fork), but has there been any progress on determining how the tags were repointed? I hope the explanation is stolen credentials, but possibilities include exploits on maintenance bots or even GitHub itself. -- Jacob
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