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Message-ID: <66BECFB0.3080704@gmail.com> Date: Thu, 15 Aug 2024 23:04:00 -0500 From: Jacob Bachmeyer <jcb62281@...il.com> To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com CC: Neil Horman <nhorman@...nssl.org> Subject: Re: feedback requested regarding deprecation of TLS 1.0/1.1 Hanno Böck wrote: > Hello, > > I have no particular insight on the prevalence of TLS 1.0/1.1 these > days, but I want to make a more general comment. > My impression of OpenSSL is that it has a strong tendency to ship > "bloat", i.e., features that either barely anyone needs, but that still > get added (remember Heartbeat extension?), or that should've been > deprecated long ago. > > If this effort to deprecate old protocols is a sign that this is > changing, I welcome this. I'd recommend to have a look at other things > in the OpenSSL codebase that should be trimmed. > That actually raises another question: what is actually to be gained from deprecating TLS1.0/1.1? Did the protocol significantly change or is the only major difference new cipher suites? In other words, what non-trivial code paths would dropping TLS1.0/1.1 entirely allow removing? (Concatenating SHA1+MD5 is trivial.) > I also think there's probably potential to remove some obsolete > ciphers (DSA?). While DSA is definitely obsolete (advances in conventional computing have begun to approach the ability to plausibly solve 1024-bit keys, and DSA keys *MUST* be 1024-bit, supposedly to facilitate smartcard implementations), OpenSSL is also a general cryptographic library and applications can use its primitives for other purposes. In particular, this means that dropping TLS1.0/1.1 cipher suites does *not* mean you can drop the ciphers that were used in those suites. -- Jacob
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