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Message-ID: <ZrwJHjO8c5IFN-JZ@dojo.mi.org>
Date: Tue, 13 Aug 2024 21:32:14 -0400
From: "Mike O'Connor" <mjo@...o.mi.org>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: feedback requested regarding deprecation of TLS
1.0/1.1
:OpenSSL is currently considering the deprecation of the TLS 1.0/1.1
:protocols. Currently TLS1.1 and TLS 1.0 are disabled at run time, and
:requires enablement by reducing the ssl security level value.
:
:The current proposal under consideration is to explicitly disable TLS
:1.0/1.1 at build time, in our 4.0 release (tentatively scheduled to release
:in the next 12-18 months), with an eye to completely remove the impacted
:code in a future major release. The default configuration could be
:overridden to re-enable TLS 1.0/1.1 at build time.
:
:Questions to the community are:
:
:1) Are distributions/users comfortable with this approach in the time frame
:proposed?
Not really. Entities who control the OpenSSL they run on their
systems, OSes, etc. don't necessarily control all the broken things
that said systems/OSes need to interact with.
:2) Would builders of OpenSSL consider using the default configuration (with
:TLS1.0/1.1 disabled in 4.0), or would they ship with these protocols
:re-enabled in their builds?
Either it'd be re-enabled in the build, or there'll be a fork that
supports TLS 1.0/1.1 in relative perpetuity. It was only recently
that some mainstream Linuxes stopped shipping a compat openssl 0.9.8
and all the stale protocol baggage that goes along with that, for
support of some "business critical" commercial apps.
:3) If the deprecated protocols are re-enabled, what would constitute a
:reasonable warning mechanism to inform users that these protocols are going
:away at some point in the future to pressure users to update to a newer,
:more secure protocol?
I'd be inclined to position such a move and associated warning message
in terms of PQC, which AFAIK doesn't and won't support TLS 1.0/1.1.
As PQC gets "refined", it wouldn't surprise me to see the quantum
computing boogeyman drive out TLS 1.0/1.1 in critical applications.
Let PQC be the spike that kills TLS 1.0/1.1 dead.
I've been leery to post this for fear of going too far down some
"quantum" rat's nest. So please, be gentle.
Take FWIW...
-Mike
--
Michael J. O'Connor mjo@...o.mi.org
=--==--==--==--==--==--==--==--==--==--==--==--==--==--==--==--==--==--==--=
"You can't teach an old dogma new tricks." -Dorothy Parker
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