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Message-ID: <CAFRnB2V=WV_vECtLQ1dgxATOd+raWGbqvGjcXyhEQnaCYfjiFA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 6 Aug 2024 18:08:46 -0400
From: Alex Gaynor <alex.gaynor@...il.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: feedback requested regarding deprecation of TLS 1.0/1.1
Hi Neil,
Answering on behalf of the Python Cryptographic Authority, which
develops pyca/cryptography, the most widely used Python cryptography
library. We distribute binary builds that statically link a copy of
OpenSSL.
1) Yes, we're fine with dropping TLS 1.0/1.1 on this time frame.
Frankly, we'd be fine dropping it faster.
2) We would not re-enable TLS1.0/1.1 in our releases. Users wishing to
use these protocols would be responsible for building and linking
their own OpenSSL.
3) I don't have a good answer for you. I think systems programming is
fairly impoverished in terms of ways to emit _runtime_ warnings. I'd
suggest focusing on compile-time warnings.
Alex
On Tue, Aug 6, 2024 at 7:29 AM Neil Horman <nhorman@...nssl.org> wrote:
>
> Neil Horman <nhorman@...nssl.org>
> 4:19 AM (42 minutes ago)
> to openssl-security
>
> OpenSSL is currently considering the deprecation of the TLS 1.0/1.1
> protocols. Currently TLS1.1 and TLS 1.0 are disabled at run time, and
> requires enablement by reducing the ssl security level value.
>
> The current proposal under consideration is to explicitly disable TLS
> 1.0/1.1 at build time, in our 4.0 release (tentatively scheduled to release
> in the next 12-18 months), with an eye to completely remove the impacted
> code in a future major release. The default configuration could be
> overridden to re-enable TLS 1.0/1.1 at build time.
>
> Questions to the community are:
>
> 1) Are distributions/users comfortable with this approach in the time frame
> proposed?
>
> 2) Would builders of OpenSSL consider using the default configuration (with
> TLS1.0/1.1 disabled in 4.0), or would they ship with these protocols
> re-enabled in their builds?
>
> 3) If the deprecated protocols are re-enabled, what would constitute a
> reasonable warning mechanism to inform users that these protocols are going
> away at some point in the future to pressure users to update to a newer,
> more secure protocol?
>
> Input on these questions is requested and appreciated
--
All that is necessary for evil to succeed is for good people to do nothing.
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