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Message-ID: <ZqAWEWkm6Y5LMGli@michel-fedora-PC198L6J>
Date: Tue, 23 Jul 2024 15:44:01 -0500
From: Michel Lind <michel@...hel-slm.name>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: linux-distros application for CentOS Project's
Hyperscale SIG
Hi Alexander,
On Tue, Jul 23, 2024 at 09:23:10PM +0200, Solar Designer wrote:
> Hi,
>
> I've finally reviewed the links and re-read the thread. Looks like
> we're OK to proceed with adding CentOS Project's Hyperscale SIG as a
> linux-distros member.
>
> Michel, please e-mail me off-list with PGP keys for all of you who need
> to be subscribed for Hyperscale. I also need to know who will be
> managing this subscription on your end (informing me of any changes in
> who's to stay subscribed).
>
Thank you! I'll email once I have collected all the keys.
> On Wed, Jul 10, 2024 at 06:54:13PM -0500, Michel Lind wrote:
> > All three of us are Fedora developers - but AIUI, we will not and can not use
> > membership here to contribute Fedora patches - until the embargo is
> > over.
> >
> > For Hyperscale itself we plan to use the head start to have local builds
> > ready to go, and commit and do a public build as soon as the embargo is
> > over; if it needs collaboration we can use private Git repos and E2EE
> > private chats to discuss the fix among ourselves.
> >
> > This is, to the best of my knowledge, similar to how AlmaLinux handles
> > embargoed security issues - the fix is ready to go but is only made
> > available once the embargo is lifted.
> >
> > Now - wearing our Fedora hats, we certainly would try and help get this
> > fixed in Fedora once the embargo is over (as we've done before) - and
> > knowing a CVE is going to be made public would certainly help (e.g.
> > trying to make sure one of us is around) - but we won't be participating
> > in the list wearing our Fedora hat, or discuss embargoed issues with
> > people not on the list.
>
> This understanding is correct. The membership and embargoed info is
> only for the specific distro "except with the reporter's explicit
> approval". This exception means that you may occasionally ask whoever
> reported the issue to linux-distros for permission to use the
> information e.g. also for preparing a fix for Fedora even though you're
> subscribed for Hyperscale. To avoid miscoordination, please keep such
> requests also CC'ed to the list. Uses of this exception have been very
> rare so far, and it is expected that you wouldn't use it often, or else
> it'd make more sense to discuss the additional distro becoming a member.
>
Thanks. Good to know this exception exists, but I'm hoping to prod
Fedora to onboard itself as a member anyway.
> FWIW, Fedora's fix for CVE-2024-6387 was quite timely as-is:
>
> commit dcbca7b947cf82c30d6f477a26efd2f765204fe6
> Author: Gordon Messmer <gordon.messmer@...il.com>
> AuthorDate: Mon Jul 1 20:49:16 2024 -0700
> Commit: Gordon Messmer <gordon.messmer@...il.com>
> CommitDate: Tue Jul 2 00:48:16 2024 -0700
>
> Patch 9.6p1 for CVE-2024-6387
>
> * Mon Jul 01 2024 Gordon Messmer <gordon.messmer@...il.com> - 9.6p1-12
> - Patch 9.6p1 for CVE-2024-6387
>
> On one hand, this confirms that Fedora cares. On the other, for an
> issue with a trivial patch, I don't know if Fedora could have done much
> or anything more to prepare.
>
It was timely .. but there was some scramble in Fedora's security room
the morning the embargo was lifted. It turns out the development Rawhide
branch was not in a buildable state at that moment - not a big deal, I
pointed out at the time that it's more important to fix the stable
releases - but with access to the embargo, someone could have fixed the
Rawhide build in preparation I suppose.
> OpenSSH 9.8 released on July 1 also fixed "Logic error in ssh(1)
> ObscureKeystrokeTiming", which became CVE-2024-39894 by July 3:
>
> https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/07/03/6
>
> Per upstream, this issue affects "9.5 through 9.7 (inclusive)", so I
> guess Fedora's package based on 9.6p1 is vulnerable. There doesn't
> appear to be a fix in the package yet. I see this is being tracked in:
>
> https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2295615
>
> which is assigned to Dmitry Belyavskiy, who is also the maintainer of
> the OpenSSH package in RHEL and CentOS Stream. RHEL is not affected and
> the issue is low severity, so will probably take a long while to fix in
> Fedora via Red Hat. Maybe something the community could do quicker?
> This is not directly related to possible linux-distros membership; this
> issue wasn't even on linux-distros.
>
Yeah - the CVE fixes were done by a non-maintainer anyway (Dmitry
understandably has his hands full with fixing RHEL and CentOS Stream).
This is tangential - but having a well-coordinated security team in
Fedora, that participates in this list and in linux-distros, would
likely help - e.g. by ensuring that the ACL of key packages like openssh
correlates to who often contributes to it, and by making sure issues
like these get addressed sooner rather than later.
--
_o) Michel Lind
_( ) identities: https://keyoxide.org/5dce2e7e9c3b1cffd335c1d78b229d2f7ccc04f2
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