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Message-ID: <ZibgVYyI4hQZl1xP@itl-email>
Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2024 18:10:27 -0400
From: Demi Marie Obenour <demi@...isiblethingslab.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: Linux: Disabling network namespaces
On Mon, Apr 22, 2024 at 02:33:56PM +0000, Jordan Glover wrote:
> On Sunday, April 21st, 2024 at 10:06 PM, Solar Designer <solar@...nwall.com> wrote:
>
> > In what exact way would nested namespaces bypass the security design of
> > Flatpak? Is this about the kernel's attack surface exposed by
> > capabilities in a namespace or something else? I guess capabilities are
> > also dropped in the nested namespace?
>
> In flatpak, apps in container communicate with host through portals[1] using dbus.
> Portals identify particular app through unique appid (i.e. "org.mozilla.firefox"
> for firefox) and grant some permissions according to that. appid is read from
> /.flatpak-info that exist inside container and is immutable there. If namespaces
> were available inside sandbox then malicious app could leverage mount namespace
> to mount crafted /.flatpak-info containing arbitrary data and lie to the portal
> about appid - it could tell portal that it's org.mozilla.firefox when it isn't.
>
> [1] https://github.com/flatpak/xdg-desktop-portal
>
> Jordan
Why is the appid read from /.flatpak-info, instead of having the flatpak
process that spawned the container pass the info to the dbus proxy along
with the FD used to communicate with the container?
--
Sincerely,
Demi Marie Obenour (she/her/hers)
Invisible Things Lab
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