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Message-ID: <KN_TQotLatAri5wrOvD-713YsGUE_Slhytf8p8fywmPlELdOZhnceWk_tldcKnaBIBZoJUajwZNkGu6xzj38x6JsQtyMzBpcNwOeHe3fa9E=@protonmail.ch>
Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2024 14:33:56 +0000
From: Jordan Glover <Golden_Miller83@...tonmail.ch>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: Linux: Disabling network namespaces
On Sunday, April 21st, 2024 at 10:06 PM, Solar Designer <solar@...nwall.com> wrote:
> In what exact way would nested namespaces bypass the security design of
> Flatpak? Is this about the kernel's attack surface exposed by
> capabilities in a namespace or something else? I guess capabilities are
> also dropped in the nested namespace?
In flatpak, apps in container communicate with host through portals[1] using dbus.
Portals identify particular app through unique appid (i.e. "org.mozilla.firefox"
for firefox) and grant some permissions according to that. appid is read from
/.flatpak-info that exist inside container and is immutable there. If namespaces
were available inside sandbox then malicious app could leverage mount namespace
to mount crafted /.flatpak-info containing arbitrary data and lie to the portal
about appid - it could tell portal that it's org.mozilla.firefox when it isn't.
[1] https://github.com/flatpak/xdg-desktop-portal
Jordan
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