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Message-ID: <20240412163744.6z5n5fhqdu27jybj@jwilk.net> Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2024 18:37:44 +0200 From: Jakub Wilk <jwilk@...lk.net> To: <oss-security@...ts.openwall.com> Subject: Re: Re: backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to ssh server compromise * Jonathan Schleifer <js@....im>, 2024-03-30 17:17: >I replaced the sed in here: > >sed \"r\n\" $gl_am_configmake | eval $gl_path_map | >$gl_localedir_prefix -d 2>/dev/null > >With a simple cat, as I could not make sed work. This worries me as it >means there is probably some other transformation that I'm missing that >would have made the sed work. It's confusing because there are two layers of eval involved. You actually end up running: sed rn ... The "r" command means "read from file"; but there's no file named "n", so this is no-op. The sed command is not completely equivalent to cat though: it appends a newline, because the original file didn't end with one. This trailing garbage slightly upsets xz(1): xz: (stdin): Unexpected end of input (You normally wouldn't see this warning, thanks to generous use of "2>/dev/null" in build-to-host.m4.) -- Jakub Wilk
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