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Message-ID: <20240409233648.igiak63z7ep2nmco@awork3.anarazel.de> Date: Tue, 9 Apr 2024 16:36:48 -0700 From: Andres Freund <andres@...razel.de> To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com Subject: Re: xz backdoor prevention using hosts.deny? Hi, On 2024-04-08 23:00:48 -0500, Jacob Bachmeyer wrote: > I am not so sure about this. The original discovery of this backdoor > observed a slowdown in refusing a session for a nonexistent account using > only SSH publickey auth, *not* SSH certificate auth. Reports have also > suggested that testing began after common botnet scans were observed to be > causing sshd to use an inordinate amount of CPU time. I doubt botnets are > presenting certificates either. > I am unsure how sshd would call RSA_public_decrypt in those situations, > which suggests that the backdoor blob is more complex than we currently > think. The slow part of the backdoor is *not* when actually calling RSA_public_decrypt(). It's the "initialization" of the backdoor, which happens very early during sshd startup, well before reaching main(). Note how, in the initial report, even "sshd -h" is slow if called in the right environment. https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/03/29/4 : > In fact, openssh does not need to be started as a server to observe the > slowdown: > > slow: > env -i LANG=C /usr/sbin/sshd -h > In fact, I would expect sshd to reject the connection without ever > attempting to verify a signature if the requested account does not exist, > yet a significant delay in that rejection led to the discovery of the > backdoor. See https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/03/30/37 for the path leading to certification validation before certificate validity, users, etc are checked. Greetings, Andres Freund
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