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Message-ID: <ed2715be-e7a0-4a7f-a3fd-7041f6c6fa49@fu-berlin.de> Date: Sun, 31 Mar 2024 19:13:35 +0200 From: "Michael.Karcher" <Michael.Karcher@...berlin.de> To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com Cc: Andres Freund <andres@...razel.de> Subject: Re: backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to ssh server compromise Am 29.03.2024 um 16:51 schrieb Andres Freund: > Florian Weimer first extracted the injected code in isolation, also attached, > liblzma_la-crc64-fast.o, I had only looked at the whole binary. Thanks! Thanks for your excellent write-up, and thanks to Florian Weimer for posting the injected code. > I am *not* a security researcher, nor a reverse engineer. There's lots of > stuff I have not analyzed and most of what I observed is purely from > observation rather than exhaustively analyzing the backdoor code. I am a reverse engineer, and tried some static analysis on that code. One key feature is that the code does not contain any ASCII strings, neither in clear text nor in obfuscated form. Instead, it recognizes all relevant strings using one single deterministic finite automaton, a technique commonly used to search for terms given by regular expressions. I wrote a script that decodes the tables for the table-driven DFA and outputs the strings recognized by it accompanied with the "ID" assigned to the terminal accepting state that represents that string. You can find this script (and possibly other stuff I found interesting later) at https://github.com/karcherm/xz-malware . Kind Regards, Michael Karcher
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