[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date: Mon, 1 Apr 2024 00:40:14 +0300
From: Michael Tokarev <mjt@....msk.ru>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com, Solar Designer <solar@...nwall.com>
Subject: Re: backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to ssh
server compromise
31.03.2024 23:55, Solar Designer:
>> poettering 2 days ago (2024-03-29)
>> Libselinux pulls in liblzma too and gets linked into tons more programs
>> than libsystemd. And will end up in sshd too (at the very least via
>> libpam/pam_selinux). And most of the really big distros tend do support
>> selinux at least to some level. Hence systemd or not, sshd remains
>> vulnerable by this specific attack.
>>
>> With that in mind libsystemd git dropped the dep on liblzma actually,
>> all compressors are now dlopen deps and thus only pulled in when needed.
>
> The libselinux concern is important. I've just checked a few systems
> where libsystemd does pull liblzma, and on those libselinux does not.
> However, I guess such systems do exist too? PAM modules would have been
> too late for the current backdoor, but the backdoor could be different
> if that were the vector it needed to target.
As has been said elsewhere, apparently libselinux dependency on liblzma
is actually an error coming from here:
https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/libselinux/blob/rawhide/f/libselinux.spec#_22
which is just a .spec file remnant from redhat-specific patch from some
distant past which has been dropped long ago.
/mjt
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Please check out the
Open Source Software Security Wiki, which is counterpart to this
mailing list.
Confused about mailing lists and their use?
Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia
and check out these
guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.
