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Message-ID: <CAFRnB2WJ0GAmW0FeNVOnFoWQnS5wfc9qchKC54xao4=oP9R-Xw@mail.gmail.com> Date: Fri, 29 Mar 2024 13:10:40 -0400 From: Alex Gaynor <alex.gaynor@...il.com> To: Andres Freund <andres@...razel.de> Cc: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com Subject: Re: backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to ssh server compromise On Fri, Mar 29, 2024 at 1:07 PM Andres Freund <andres@...razel.de> wrote: > > Hi Alex, > > (I was not subscribed to oss-security and not CCed, so I only got your email > from the archive, not sure if I got the In-Reply-To etc right. Subscribed > now.) Your email came through. > > > Thanks for writing this up. Just to make sure I understand the action > > item here: folks who are building their own xz, should switch to a > > release prior to 5.6.0, as those are the only ones known to be > > unaffected? > > If you are building your own xz you might not be affected, due to either the > debian/ directory needing to exist, or $RPM_ARCH needing to be > set. Furthermore, if you build from git, rather than the distributed tarballs, > the backdoor code won't be injected into the build, even if present in the > repository. Similar if you build with cmake, I think. > > However, I personally would still downgrade, even if likely not affected due > to the above. > > Greetings, > > Andres Freund Thanks for confirming, and indeed I'm taking a better safe than sorry approach. Alex -- All that is necessary for evil to succeed is for good people to do nothing.
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