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Message-ID: <CAJ33NAWcjFPKG-6p2dzjJoO0MZjTCu3xx7U40YumQfW9pPyg0w@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 19 Jul 2023 18:28:10 +0530
From: Sandipan Roy <saroy@...hat.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory
Hello Tomas,
I guess the Advisory URL is wrong here, it's redirected to CVE-2023-2975
advisory.
On Wed, Jul 19, 2023 at 5:09 PM Tomas Mraz <tomas@...nssl.org> wrote:
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA256
>
> OpenSSL Security Advisory [19th July 2023]
> ==========================================
>
> Excessive time spent checking DH keys and parameters (CVE-2023-3446)
> ====================================================================
>
> Severity: Low
>
> Issue summary: Checking excessively long DH keys or parameters may be very
> slow.
>
> Impact summary: Applications that use the functions DH_check(),
> DH_check_ex()
> or EVP_PKEY_param_check() to check a DH key or DH parameters may
> experience long
> delays. Where the key or parameters that are being checked have been
> obtained
> from an untrusted source this may lead to a Denial of Service.
>
> The function DH_check() performs various checks on DH parameters. One of
> those
> checks confirms that the modulus ("p" parameter) is not too large. Trying
> to use
> a very large modulus is slow and OpenSSL will not normally use a modulus
> which
> is over 10,000 bits in length.
>
> However the DH_check() function checks numerous aspects of the key or
> parameters
> that have been supplied. Some of those checks use the supplied modulus
> value
> even if it has already been found to be too large.
>
> An application that calls DH_check() and supplies a key or parameters
> obtained
> from an untrusted source could be vulernable to a Denial of Service attack.
>
> The function DH_check() is itself called by a number of other OpenSSL
> functions.
> An application calling any of those other functions may similarly be
> affected.
> The other functions affected by this are DH_check_ex() and
> EVP_PKEY_param_check().
>
> Also vulnerable are the OpenSSL dhparam and pkeyparam command line
> applications
> when using the "-check" option.
>
> The OpenSSL SSL/TLS implementation is not affected by this issue.
>
> The OpenSSL 3.0 and 3.1 FIPS providers are not affected by this issue.
>
> OpenSSL 3.1, 3.0, 1.1.1 and 1.0.2 are vulnerable to this issue.
>
> Due to the low severity of this issue we are not issuing new releases of
> OpenSSL at this time. The fix will be included in the next releases when
> they
> become available. The fix is also available in commit fc9867c1 (for 3.1),
> commit 1fa20cf2 (for 3.0) and commit 8780a896 (for 1.1.1) in the OpenSSL
> git
> repository. It is available to premium support customer in commit 9a0a4d3c
> (for
> 1.0.2).
>
> OSSfuzz first detected and automatically reported this issue on 25th June
> 2023 using a fuzzer recently added to OpenSSL written by Kurt Roeckx. The
> fix
> was developed by Matt Caswell.
>
> General Advisory Notes
> ======================
>
> URL for this Security Advisory:
> https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20230714.txt
>
> Note: the online version of the advisory may be updated with additional
> details
> over time.
>
> For details of OpenSSL severity classifications please see:
> https://www.openssl.org/policies/secpolicy.html
>
> OpenSSL 1.1.1 will reach end-of-life on 2023-09-11. After that date
> security
> fixes for 1.1.1 will only be available to premium support customers.
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>
--
*Sandipan Roy*
Product Security Engineer, Product Security
Secure Engineering - Incident Response
Email: sandipan@...hat.com
PGP:0x4B5C7470051BB332 <https://bytehackr.fedorapeople.org/saroy.asc>
*secalert@...hat.com <secalert@...hat.com>* For Urgent Response.
<https://www.redhat.com/>
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