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Message-ID: <CAN5gJXqyLMcJD0Wnfy6B4OJKpaggjZGHN-nRkk8DDO=s=y6TLg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 20 Jun 2023 17:16:58 -0700
From: Alistair Crooks <agc@...src.org>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: PAM/Kerberos issue on NetBSD
Hi folks,
The fix for a pam/kerberos issue on NetBSD has already been fixed and
pullups requested for release branches, see:
https://mail-index.netbsd.org/source-changes/2023/06/20/msg145461.html
(commit log appended to this mail) and CVE-2023-3326
For various platforms, the exposure is not thought to be that great
+ Linux - not believed to be affected (would be good to get some
corroboration for this)
+ FreeBSD - affected, but not in the default install
+ OpenBSD - no kerberos
+ DragonflyBSD - no kerberos
+ NetBSD - sadly affected
This was found via code inspection by Taylor Campbell (riastradh@...BSD.org
)
My apologies for the pre-announcement not making the distros list ahead of
time, an internal miscommunication.
Regards,
agc
Module Name: src
Committed By: riastradh
Date: Tue Jun 20 22:17:18 UTC 2023
Modified Files:
src/lib/libpam/modules/pam_krb5: pam_krb5.8 pam_krb5.c
Log Message:
pam_krb5: Refuse to operate without a key to verify tickets.
New allow_kdc_spoof overrides this to restore previous behaviour
which was vulnerable to KDC spoofing, because without a host or
service key, pam_krb5 can't distinguish the legitimate KDC from a
spoofed one.
This way, having pam_krb5 enabled isn't dangerous even if you create
an empty /etc/krb5.conf to use client SSO without any host services.
Perhaps this should use krb5_verify_init_creds(3) instead, and
thereby respect the rather obscurely named krb5.conf option
verify_ap_req_nofail like the Linux pam_krb5 does, but:
- verify_ap_req_nofail is default-off (i.e., vulnerable by default),
- changing verify_ap_req_nofail to default-on would probably affect
more things and therefore be riskier,
- allow_kdc_spoof is a much clearer way to spell the idea,
- this patch is a smaller semantic change and thus less risky, and
- a security change with compatibility issues shouldn't have a
workaround that might introduce potentially worse security issues
or more compatibility issues.
Perhaps this should use krb5_verify_user(3) with secure=1 instead,
for simplicity, but it's not clear how to do that without first
prompting for the password -- which we shouldn't do at all if we
later decide we won't be able to use it anyway -- and without
repeating a bunch of the logic here anyway to pick the service name.
References about verify_ap_req_nofail:
- mit-krb5 discussion about verify_ap_req_nofail:
https://mailman.mit.edu/pipermail/krbdev/2011-January/009778.html
- Oracle has the default-secure setting in their krb5 system:
https://docs.oracle.com/cd/E26505_01/html/E27224/setup-148.html
https://docs.oracle.com/cd/E26505_01/html/816-5174/krb5.conf-4.html#REFMAN4krb5.conf-4
https://docs.oracle.com/cd/E19253-01/816-4557/gihyu/
- Heimdal issue on verify_ap_req_nofail default:
https://github.com/heimdal/heimdal/issues/1129
To generate a diff of this commit:
cvs rdiff -u -r1.12 -r1.13 src/lib/libpam/modules/pam_krb5/pam_krb5.8
cvs rdiff -u -r1.30 -r1.31 src/lib/libpam/modules/pam_krb5/pam_krb5.c
Please note that diffs are not public domain; they are subject to the
copyright notices on the relevant files.
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