oss-security - Xen Security Advisory 429 v3 (CVE-2022-42331) - x86: speculative vulnerability in 32bit SYSCALL path

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Message-Id: <E1peafW-0000G3-UU@xenbits.xenproject.org>
Date: Tue, 21 Mar 2023 12:00:46 +0000
From: Xen.org security team <security@....org>
To: xen-announce@...ts.xen.org, xen-devel@...ts.xen.org,
 xen-users@...ts.xen.org, oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
CC: Xen.org security team <security-team-members@....org>
Subject: Xen Security Advisory 429 v3 (CVE-2022-42331) - x86: speculative
 vulnerability in 32bit SYSCALL path

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256

            Xen Security Advisory CVE-2022-42331 / XSA-429
                               version 3

          x86: speculative vulnerability in 32bit SYSCALL path

UPDATES IN VERSION 3
====================

Public release.

ISSUE DESCRIPTION
=================

Due to an oversight in the very original Spectre/Meltdown security work
(XSA-254), one entrypath performs its speculation-safety actions too
late.

In some configurations, there is an unprotected RET instruction which
can be attacked with a variety of speculative attacks.

IMPACT
======

An attacker might be able to infer the contents of arbitrary host
memory, including memory assigned to other guests.

VULNERABLE SYSTEMS
==================

Xen versions 4.5 through 4.17 are vulnerable.  Older versions are not
vulnerable.

Only x86 CPUs are potentially vulnerable.  CPUs of other architectures
are not vulnerable.

The problematic codepath is only reachable on x86 CPUs which follow
AMD's behaviour with respect to SYSCALL instructions from compatibility
mode segments.  This means that AMD and Hygon CPUs are potentially
vulnerable, whereas Intel CPUs are not.  Other vendors have not been
checked.

Only PV guests can leverage the vulnerability.

On Xen 4.16 and later, the vulnerability is only present if 32bit PV
guest support is compiled in - i.e. CONFIG_PV32=y.  On Xen 4.15 and
older, all supported build configurations are vulnerable.

The vulnerability is only present when booting on hardware that supports
SMEP or SMAP (Supervisor Mode Execution/Access Prevention).  This is
believed to be some Family 0x16 models, and all later CPUs.

MITIGATION
==========

Not running untrusted PV guests will avoid the issue.

CREDITS
=======

This issue was discovered by Andrew Cooper of XenServer.

RESOLUTION
==========

Applying the appropriate attached patch resolves this issue.

Note that patches for released versions are generally prepared to
apply to the stable branches, and may not apply cleanly to the most
recent release tarball.  Downstreams are encouraged to update to the
tip of the stable branch before applying these patches.

xsa429.patch           xen-unstable - Xen 4.16
xsa429-4.15.patch      Xen 4.15 - Xen 4.14

$ sha256sum xsa429*
2d7be90d917c475ab5217e657d2b44f5d8b107d9023dca034fcfb7feab07b2f0  xsa429.meta
36ed36dbfaad9e5df5fa87b9a3d9e9c531f476f97eeb2afe280aa238032a0540  xsa429.patch
7ac3d4182585e5d2d39231f10e7c0c9fcb972c82cf81cb884e95b628187de3a7  xsa429-4.15.patch
$

DEPLOYMENT DURING EMBARGO
=========================

Deployment of the patches and/or mitigations described above (or
others which are substantially similar) is permitted during the
embargo, even on public-facing systems with untrusted guest users and
administrators.

But: Distribution of updated software is prohibited (except to other
members of the predisclosure list).

Predisclosure list members who wish to deploy significantly different
patches and/or mitigations, please contact the Xen Project Security
Team.

(Note: this during-embargo deployment notice is retained in
post-embargo publicly released Xen Project advisories, even though it
is then no longer applicable.  This is to enable the community to have
oversight of the Xen Project Security Team's decisionmaking.)

For more information about permissible uses of embargoed information,
consult the Xen Project community's agreed Security Policy:
  http://www.xenproject.org/security-policy.html
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Download attachment "xsa429.meta" of type "application/octet-stream" (1531 bytes)

Download attachment "xsa429.patch" of type "application/octet-stream" (1842 bytes)

Download attachment "xsa429-4.15.patch" of type "application/octet-stream" (1929 bytes)
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