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Message-ID: <20230319091821.6f2073fb.hanno@hboeck.de>
Date: Sun, 19 Mar 2023 09:18:21 +0100
From: Hanno Böck <hanno@...eck.de>
To: Jakub Wilk <jwilk@...lk.net>
Cc: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: TTY pushback vulnerabilities / TIOCSTI
On Fri, 17 Mar 2023 20:41:02 +0100
Jakub Wilk <jwilk@...lk.net> wrote:
> TIOCLINUX implements also functionality unrelated to copying and
> pasting. See the ioctl_console(2) man page:
> https://manpages.debian.org/unstable/manpages-dev/ioctl_console.2.en.html#TIOCLINUX
>
> For example, apparently some of this stuff is used by systemd:
Ok, good point. So disabling TIOCLINUX isn't an option.
Looking into it, maybe restricting any TIOCLINUX sub features that
implement anything related to selection would be a good option. The gpm
daemon runs as root anyway.
Do you see any risk left if
TIOCL_SETSEL
TIOCL_PASTESEL
TIOCL_SELLOADLUT
are no longer accessible to non-privileged processes?
--
Hanno Böck
https://hboeck.de/
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