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Message-ID: <d5567e4b-884c-9449-1cfc-0c21b6a4a752@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 22 Apr 2022 02:43:27 +0200
From: David Bouman <dbouman03@...il.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Linux: UaF due to concurrency issue in io_uring timeouts
Hello list,
We (Jayden Rivers and David Bouman) are disclosing a bug we found in the
Linux kernel's io_uring subsystem. We have written a local privilege
escalation PoC that can successfully elevate to system root from an
unprivileged process (in a container). We will be releasing a blog post
(including exploit code) in a week or two. It should be noted that
unlike many Linux vulnerabilities that have surfaced recently,
triggering this one does not require an attacker to have any kind of
privileges (e.g. in a user namespace). This leaves many systems vulnerable.
We are still looking for a CNA representative that can assign a CVE
number for this vulnerability; please contact us!
Kernel versions 5.10+ are affected, and linux-stable patches are already
pushed. The upstream patch commit is
e677edbcabee849bfdd43f1602bccbecf736a646 ("io_uring: fix race between
timeout flush and removal").
When the IORING_OP_TIMEOUT (T) and IORING_OP_LINK_TIMEOUT (LT) opcodes
are combined in a linked submission queue entry, and another request (B)
finishes, a race might occur: namely, when due to the completion of B, T
is cancelled (through the completion event count), and LT is canceled by
its hrtimer at the same time. Whilst T is still being cleaned up, LT is
already freed by a different execution context, and since they are
linked, the cleanup of T retains a dangling reference to the now-freed
LT. Hence, there's a use-after-free.
Exploitation-wise, the attacker can reallocate LT to another `struct
io_kiocb` and defer the UaF to e.g. a `struct file` (this is the
technique we will describe in aforementioned blog post).
The race window is quite tight and the scenario is complicated, so the
race can only be won very infrequently in our experience.
It is advised to upgrade your kernel to latest ASAP.
Greetings,
Jayden Rivers & David Bouman
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