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Message-ID: <Yd5eiNskXgdDCdID@sol.nexus.lan>
Date: Tue, 11 Jan 2022 22:52:24 -0600
From: John Helmert III <ajak@...too.org>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: CVE-2021-3979 ceph: Ceph volume does not honour
osd_dmcrypt_key_size
On Tue, Jan 11, 2022 at 04:10:06PM -0500, Ana McTaggart wrote:
> Hi all,
> The key length for encrypted devices created using ceph-volume is
> incorrect. This is due to a bug in ceph_volume/util/encryption.py, where
> upon writing a key using osd_dmcrypt_key_size it does not pass the key size
> to the format and open operations following. The default key is then
> applied in cryptsetup. All versions since Luminous are assumed affected. At
> Red Hat. we have assigned it CVE-2021-3979 and proposed a CVSS score of
> 6.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
>
> See below for the report, credit of Mark Kirkwood.
>
> We happened to run 'cryptsetup luksDump' on some of our encrypted
> devices that were created using ceph-volume and noticed the key length
> was wrong:
>
> e.g:
>
> markir@...h3:~$ cat /etc/ceph/ceph.conf
> ...
> [osd]
> osd_dmcrypt_type = luks
> osd_cryptsetup_parameters = --cipher aes-xts-plain64
> osd_dmcrypt_key_size = 512
>
> markir@...h3:~$ sudo cryptsetup luksDump
> /dev/mapper/ceph--9e3502c0--a991--44cc--a2a1--0e8e8fb45189-osd--block--aaab9851--5951--429d--8e9d--dbc22ea4c1a1
>
>
> Version: 1
> Cipher name: aes
> Cipher mode: xts-plain64
> Hash spec: sha256
> Payload offset: 4096
> MK bits: 256 <=========== should be 512
>
>
> This appears to be due to a bug in ceph_volume/util/encryption.py. While
> it writes a key using osd_dmcrypt_key_size it does not pass the key size
> to the following format and open operations. It looks like that ecause
> the key is being passed to cryptsetup on stdin that the length is not
> being deduced, and so the default key size is being applied.
>
> It is fairly simple to patch (see attached - luks operation only, prob
> needs plain code path altered similarly).
>
> In terms of which versions are impacted, we are running Luminous, but
> the patch I have attached is against current master, so suspect all
> versions since Luminous are in the crosshairs.
Was a patch meant to be attached? Is there any report or PR upstream?
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