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Message-ID: <73c78b13-5086-02eb-a496-4367a5712949@caret.be>
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 2021 12:52:18 +0100
From: Jens Timmerman <jens@...et.be>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: IMA gadgets
On 11/30/21 22:27, Grant Taylor wrote:
>
>> This means an attacker can turn any binary into a SUID binary. The
>> signatures do not cover these file attributes, so they will still
>> verify.
>
> It may be possible to add SUID and / or capabilities to a signed file.
> But I have to question how such a questionable non-SUID binary would
> be given a signature in the first place? Or asked another why, why
> would a questionable file be given a IMA signature in the first place?
An attacker doesn't need to SUID a questionable binary, just any binary
that would then allow to execute commands. e.g. /usr/bin/bash or less
obvious but still obvious perl, python, vim, sudoedit, and 100's of
other default tools that could be used to an attackers advantage once
they are SUID.
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