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Message-ID: <Pine.BSM.4.64L.2108071847450.4154@herc.mirbsd.org>
Date: Sat, 7 Aug 2021 18:49:57 +0000 (UTC)
From: Thorsten Glaser <tg@...bsd.de>
To: Ariadne Conill <ariadne@...eferenced.org>
cc: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com, Axel Beckert <abe@...ian.org>,
        lynx-dev@...gnu.org, security@...ian.org, 991971@...s.debian.org
Subject: Re: [Lynx-dev] Re: bug in Lynx' SSL certificate
 validation -> leaks password in clear text via SNI (under some circumstances)

Ariadne Conill dixit:

> It turns out SNI is only marginally related to this issue.  The issue
> itself is far more severe: HTParse() does not understand the authn
> part of the URI at all.

Yes, of course. But without SNI, nothing would have been sent *in
plaintext* at all. The certificate validation fails¹, the connection
stops and the user is asked whether to continue.

① Tested on an OS without SNI in its libssl.

> As a workaround, I taught HTParse() how to parse the authn part of URIs, but
> Lynx itself needs to actually properly support the authn part really.
>
> I have attached the patch Alpine is using to work around this infoleak.

Thanks!

I recall having to work manually to strip the port from the hostname
for SSL certificate validation, ages ago, but I had not tested with
HTTP Auth sites back then.

bye,
//mirabilos
-- 
Gestern Nacht ist mein IRC-Netzwerk explodiert. Ich hatte nicht damit
gerechnet, darum bin ich blutverschmiert… wer konnte ahnen, daß SIE so
reagier’n… gestern Nacht ist mein IRC-Netzwerk explodiert~~~
	(as of 2021-06-15 The MirOS Project temporarily reconvenes on OFTC)

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