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Message-ID: <YM4Z/IKm2cxFrB8D@mussarela> Date: Sat, 19 Jun 2021 13:23:24 -0300 From: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@...onical.com> To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com Cc: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@...tkopp.net>, Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@...gutronix.de>, Norbert Slusarek <nslusarek@....net> Subject: Re: CVE-2021-3609: Race condition in net/can/bcm.c leads to local privilege escalation On Sat, Jun 19, 2021 at 04:40:53PM +0200, Norbert Slusarek wrote: > Hello, > > this is an announcement for the recently reported bug (CVE-2021-3609) > in the CAN BCM networking protocol in the Linux kernel ranging from > version 2.6.25 to mainline 5.13-rc6. > The vulnerability is a race condition in net/can/bcm.c allowing for local > privilege escalation to root. The issue was initially reported by syzbot and > proven to be exploitable by Norbert Slusarek. > > The CAN BCM networking protocol allows to register a CAN message receiver for a > specified socket. The function bcm_rx_handler() is run for incoming CAN messages. > Simultaneously to running this function, the socket can be closed and > bcm_release() will be called. Inside bcm_release(), struct bcm_op and > struct bcm_sock are freed while bcm_rx_handler() is still running, > finally leading to multiple use-after-free's. > > Reproduction > ------------ > > - setup unprivileged user namespace > - setup vcan network interface > - open two CAN BCM sockets and connect each to the interface > - call sendmsg() on socket 1 with RX_SETUP to setup CAN receiver > - call sendmsg() on socket 2 to send message to socket 1 > > Here comes the race condition: > > - bcm_rx_handler() is run automatically for socket 1 to receive the message > - call close() -> bcm_release() on socket 1 to free struct bcm_op and struct bcm_sock > > => bcm_rx_handler() is still running and will access struct bcm_op and struct > bcm_sock which were previously freed > > Exploitation > ------------ > > My exploitation attempt concentrates on kernels with version >= 5.4-rc1 > since commit bf74aa86e111 ("can: bcm: switch timer to HRTIMER_MODE_SOFT and > remove hrtimer_tasklet"). I didn't investigate into exploiting kernels older > than 5.4-rc1 which used tasklets, nevertheless exploitation on older kernels > looks feasible as well. My specific exploitation approach was adjusted to work > with Ubuntu 20.04.02 LTS but other known distributions could also be targeted. > > More exploitation details can be found at > > https://github.com/nrb547/kernel-exploitation/blob/main/cve-2021-3609/cve-2021-3609.md > > or in the attachments (plain text and attached image). > > Regards, > Norbert Slusarek And here is the proposed fix: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20210619161813.2098382-1-cascardo@canonical.com/T/#u Regards. Thadeu Cascardo.
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