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Message-ID: <YLJGrad5G0KL5Ls3@kroah.com>
Date: Sat, 29 May 2021 15:50:37 +0200
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@...tkopp.net>
Cc: mkl@...gutronix.de, alex.popov@...ux.com, seth.arnold@...onical.com,
steve.beattie@...onical.com, cascardo@...onical.com,
oss-security@...ts.openwall.com,
Norbert Slusarek <nslusarek@....net>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>, security@...nel.org
Subject: Re: Linux kernel: net/can/isotp: race condition leads to local
privilege escalation
On Fri, May 28, 2021 at 05:41:03PM +0200, Oliver Hartkopp wrote:
> Hello Greg,
>
> this patch ("can: isotp: prevent race between isotp_bind() and
> isotp_setsockopt()") has hit Linus' tree ~36h ago:
>
> https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/net/can?id=2b17c400aeb44daf041627722581ade527bb3c1d
>
> It has a CVE number and is potentially exploitable - but it was not in the
> latest batch of stable kernels about ~4h ago.
Give us a chance :)
>
> It was obviously not tagged properly for stable kernels but has a fixes-tag:
>
> Fixes: 921ca574cd38 ("can: isotp: add SF_BROADCAST support for functional
> addressing")
>
> which was introduced in 5.11
Now queued up, thanks.
greg k-h
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