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Message-ID: <20210418125151.GA20535@openwall.com>
Date: Sun, 18 Apr 2021 14:51:52 +0200
From: Solar Designer <solar@...nwall.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: xscreensaver package caps gets raw socket
On Sat, Apr 17, 2021 at 09:51:38PM -0300, Érico Nogueira wrote:
> Em 17/04/2021 11:31, Tavis Ormandy escreveu:
> >Summary of discussion so far:
> >
> >- In theory, mesa support running in a privileged context, their
> > documentation says they disable dangerous features in setuid/setgid
> > binaries:
> >
> > https://mesa-docs.readthedocs.io/en/latest/egl.html
> >
> > In fact, this is broken because they only check if (geteuid() !=
> > getuid()) { ... }. That check doesn't even handle setgid, let alone file
> > caps. If mesa agree this is a bug, simply changing their checks to if
> > (getauxval(AT_SECURE)) { ... } might make this bug go away, and handle
> > file caps and setgid for free. I filed a bug for that, but there
> > hasn't been a response:
> > https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/mesa/mesa/-/issues/4549
>
> The linked issue appears to be private... Not sure it makes sense, since
> the problem has been explained in this public email. FWIW, libglvnd has
> the same issue, though it at leasts (E)GID as well. Sending it here
> because I couldn't find a security contact.
>
> https://github.com/NVIDIA/libglvnd/blob/acc654454867c7cdd681cc1f60f858bcd6e5e729/src/EGL/libeglvendor.c
>
> if (getuid() == geteuid() && getgid() == getegid()) {
> env = getenv("__EGL_VENDOR_LIBRARY_FILENAMES");
> }
>
> I will look into opening an issue with them and finding a fix.
Related:
https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2019/12/04/6
"search for LIBGL_DRIVERS_PATH finds that Mesa appears to have the same
issue, and it also finds that we should also search for GBM_DRIVERS_PATH
(apparently, for older Mesa) and maybe EGL_DRIVERS_PATH and EGL_DRIVER,
and LIBVA_DRIVERS_PATH and LIBVA_DRIVER_NAME. There are probably more."
> Using `secure_getenv` in some of these cases would probably work as well
> as checking `getauxval(AT_SECURE)`, especially because it seems (from my
> quick search over at <https://man.bsd.lv>) that both are Linux specific
> anyway.
>
> It would be nice to define a `is_privileged_context()` function that
> works on most platforms to be shared across projects or used as a
> library.
Historically, that's __libc_enable_secure on glibc (although if
secure_getenv() does what's needed in a given context, then you don't
need to use __libc_enable_secure directly) and issetugid(2) on OpenBSD.
Alexander
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