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Message-ID: <2073738.irdbgypaU6@x2>
Date: Tue, 02 Mar 2021 10:18:10 -0500
From: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@...hat.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com, Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@...ian.org>
Cc: Felix Kosterhon <felix.kosterhon@...uinfra.com>
Subject: Re: Vulnerability in the Linux Audit Framework Auditd
Hello,
On Thursday, February 25, 2021 3:48:38 PM EST Salvatore Bonaccorso wrote:
> On Thu, Feb 18, 2021 at 03:52:54PM +0000, Felix Kosterhon wrote:
> > Hello Mr. Grubb,
> >
> > thank you for your insight.
> > First and foremost we would like to clarify that our intent is not
> > to put blame on anyone but to improve the level of security for the
> > affected systems and the organisations utilising Auditd.
> > According to the rules.conf manual page, file-watch rules are meant
> > to monitor any accesses to files based on their permission level.
> > For the syscalls mentioned in this report this is not the case.
> >
> > RedHat Inc. shares our perspective on this issue and has assigned a
> > CVE for the vulnerability. Additionally they informed us that they
> > will work together with the Upstream Linux Kernel Developers on
> > behalf of fixing this issue.
>
> Is there a reference to this which can be followed/tracked? Asking
> because the Red Hat bugzilla entry for CVE-2020-35501 for now would
> still be restricted, but would like to get a better idea on how to
> track this issue within Debian.
Not sure who is supposed to answer this. I started an upstream audit
discussion:
https://listman.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2021-February/msg00079.html
The current thinking is perhaps just document this in a man page. End users
can always use a syscall audit rule and pick up any use. The shipped rules
have open_by_handle_at as part of the syscalls being watched for quite some
time. Typically people don't write their own rules, they have to meet the
DISA STIG or CIS which prescribes the rules you need to be using. So, I don't
know if there really is anything to do.
Maybe we can get a patch adding open_by_handle_at to the permission filter in
the kernel. We'll just have to see how the upstream discussion unfolds.
-Steve
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