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Message-ID: <20191209145802.GI2151@jumper.schlittermann.de>
Date: Mon, 9 Dec 2019 15:58:02 +0100
From: Heiko Schlittermann <hs@...littermann.de>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: Shell wildcards considered dangerous?
Georgi Guninski <gguninski@...il.com> (Mo 09 Dez 2019 14:23:16 CET):
> ====
> $rm -rf /tmp/1 ;mkdir /tmp/1 ; cd /tmp/1 ; tar cf a.tar /etc/issue
> $ : > --to-command="yes .tar"
>
> #end creating, starts PoC
> tar xf *.tar
That's not a technical fault. It's a fault on the human side.
If you call the above command in a typical Bourne shell, you should be
prepared to handle the trouble. Smart admins don't do that.
If an application calls the above command via system(), you should
file a bug against that application. Smart programmers know how to
avoid the shell for such invocations (or avoid such invocations in the
first place.)
Best regards from Dresden/Germany
Viele Grüße aus Dresden
Heiko Schlittermann
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