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Date: Thu, 25 Jul 2019 10:34:14 -0400 (EDT)
From: Vladis Dronov <>
Subject: Re: CVE-2019-10207: linux kernel: bluetooth:
 hci_uart: 0x0 address execution as nonprivileged user


> Does this always happen in a worker thread? Does this therefore mean
> that this is not exploitable by a local user even if vm.mmap_min_addr
> and SMEP/SMAP are disabled, since the user can't mmap zero page in the
> worker thread context?

Indeed, it looks like mrvl_setup() is called from hci_power_on workqueue
only, so the worker thread context. Unfortunately, hci_* code has around
20 call-sites for hci_uart_set_flow_control() and ->tiocm[gs]et() so I'm
not sure they 100% cannot be called in the user process context also.

Best regards,
Vladis Dronov | Red Hat, Inc. | The Core Kernel | Senior Software Engineer

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