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Message-ID: <CAHk-=wggoL7jRHTVxm=XLhtGwCwQ3On=GmqZ01OZpN7JU_072Q@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 23 Jul 2019 10:08:17 -0700
From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
To: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@...il.com>
Cc: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: stack buffer overflow in fbdev
On Sat, Jul 20, 2019 at 5:35 PM Tavis Ormandy <taviso@...il.com> wrote:
>
> There is enough space to have 52 1-byte length values, which makes svd_n
> 52, then make the final value length 0x1f (the maximum), which makes
> svd_n 83 and overflows the 64 byte stack buffer svd[] with controlled
> data.
>
> This requires a malicious monitor / projector / etc, so pretty low impact.
Ok, so I went back all the way to 3.16, and in 4.4 and earlier the
only user of fb_edid_add_monspecs() was that SH-Mobile SoCs driver
that got removed for no use.
So I think we can ignore this even for stable kernels, and I'll get
the pull request that removes the function entirely some time in the
future.
Linus
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