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Message-ID: <CAPZbWnf64OLnNjuJuzmmsVNSi8tOPX+Kaiy0Evd47dw+NQP3NQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 23 Apr 2019 09:41:02 +0900
From: Seong-Joong Kim <sungjungk@...il.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: fprintd: found storing user fingerprints without encryption

Dear all,

I would like to report a vulnerability of 'fprintd'.

'fprintd' does not encrypt sensitive information before storage.
*CWE-311: Missing Encryption of Sensitive Data*

*Description:*
‘fprintd’ saves fingerprint template and without any encryption, to a file
on the host.
This could allow a process to access the stored fingerprint and then create
natural-looking original fingerprint image.
The stolen template can be replayed to the fingerprint authentication to
gain unauthorized access.
FYI, most commercial software products for fingerprint authentication
provide fingerprint data (template) encryption.

*Additional information:*
It was found that 'fprintd' saves fingerprint template and without any
encryption, to a file on the host.
This could allow a process to access the stored fingerprint.
In 'fprintd', MINDTCT feature extractor from the NIST Biometric Image
Software (NBIS) extracts fingerprint minutiae that are compliant to ANSI
INCITS 378-2004 and ISO/IEC 197942-2.
The generated template file can be easily converted to ISO/IEC 19794-2
format since it is a minor modification of the earlier ANSI-INCITS 378-2004.
Currently, it is well known threat model that the standard fingerprint
template can be reverted to original fingerprint image.
[1-5] are presented to create sophisticated and natural-looking
fingerprints only from the numerical template data format as defined in
standard format.
They also successfully evaluated these approaches against a number of
undisclosed state-of-the-art algorithms and the NBIS.

*Resolve the vulnerability:*
As per upstream, the only way to safeguard the fingerprint data is to run
with SELinux, AppArmor or another LSM enabled one.
(link:
https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/libfprint/fprintd/issues/16#note_141207)
Currently, Fedora and Red Hat Enterprise Linux have a safeguard the
fingerprint data since they uses SELinux by default while Ubuntu and Debian
did not.

*Final remark:*
Once fingerprint has been leaked, victims are leaked for the rest of life
since it lasts for a life.
It is necessary to prepare for the problem.

[1] R. Cappelli et al., “Fingerprint Image Reconstruction from Standard
Templates”, IEEE Trans. on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence,
vol.29, no.9, pp.1489-1503, 2007.
[2] A. Ross et al., “From template to image: Reconstructing fingerprints
from minutiae points”, IEEE Trans on Pattern Analysis and Machine
Intelligence, vol.29, no.4, pp.544-560, 2007.
[3] R. Cappelli et al., “Can Fingerprints be reconstructed from ISO
Templates?”, IEEE ICARCV 2006.
[4] J. Feng et al., “Fingerprint Reconstruction: From Minutiae to Phase”,
IEEE Trans on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence, vol.33, no.2,
pp.209-223, 2011.
[5] A. Rozsa et al., "Genetic Algorithm Attack on Minutiae-Based
Fingerprint Authentication and Protected Template Fingerprint Systems",
CVPR 2015.

Sincerely,
Seong-Joong Kim

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