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Date: Fri, 17 Aug 2018 10:03:40 +0200
From: Florian Weimer <>
To: Doran Moppert <>
Cc:, Frediano Ziglio <>
Subject: Re: spice CVE-2018-10873: post-auth crash or potential
 heap corruption when demarshalling

On 08/17/2018 02:51 AM, Doran Moppert wrote:
>      +        if (SPICE_UNLIKELY((start + 2) > message_end)) {
>      +            goto error;
>      +        }

These checks are still technically invalid because start + 2 is not a 
valid pointer if it points past the allocated object.

This is more problematic here:

>     +            if (SPICE_UNLIKELY((start2 + 2 + cursor_u__nw_size) > message_end)) {
>     +                goto error;
>     +            }

If cursor_u__nw_size results in pointer wraparound, the check might fail 

The commit message quotes the right pattern, nw_size > (uintptr_t) 
(message_end - start), but it is not used in the actual code AFAICS.


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