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Message-ID: <32fa222e-64d0-0be5-a21f-55d6eea0f88c@cs.tcd.ie>
Date: Wed, 13 Jun 2018 10:30:00 +0100
From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@...tcd.ie>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com, Stiepan <stie@....swiss>,
corsac@...ian.org, marcus.brinkmann@...r-uni-bochum.de
Subject: Re: Re : Re: Re : Re:
CVE-2018-12020 in GnuPG
Hiya,
On 12/06/18 21:56, Stiepan wrote:
> Hi Yves-Alexis,
>
> Any updates on this?
>
> By the way, it might be the occasion to switch to more future-proof signatures, such as
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc8391 , which are reputed as quantum-safe and do not depend on some hardness assumptions.
XMSS (RFC8391) seems like a fine thing to me, but two
notes:
1. There's another hash based scheme [1] that may or may
not have more traction, depending whom you ask.
2. IIUC these schemes have a finite number of signatures
per private key, and when you've used them all you reveal
the private key value, so different APIs are needed, and
applications need to care about that. So I'm not sure that
general adoption of these for gnu-pg would be simple. In
this context though (s/w signing), applications could make
use of 'em, if done carefully.
The best list for discussing algorithm details is probably
the CFRG list. (cfrg@...f.org)
Cheers,
S.
[1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mcgrew-hash-sigs/
> We could help with an open-source implem. if needed.
> Apparently, NIST is also moving into that direction for software signatures, according to information given now at ETSI's security week.
>
> Best regards,
> Stiepan A. Kovac
> President
> itk AVtobvS SARL
>
> Envoyé depuis ProtonMail mobile
>
> -------- Message d'origine --------
> On 10 juin 2018 à 18:38, Yves-Alexis Perez a écrit :
>
>> On Sun, 2018-06-10 at 10:58 -0400, Stiepan wrote:
>>
>> Hi Stepian,
>>
>>> This responsibility discussion is all well and fine, but now that this is
>>> half-public, may we know for sure whether we are affected :
>>> 1. as debian(-like) package consumers
>>
>> Not entirely sure what you mean here, but if you're talking about the apt
>> package managers (which relies on gpgv for signature verification), it's
>> currently investigated.
>>
>> Note that all supported suites have had their gnupg version updated: https://s
>> ecurity-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2018-12020
>>
>> Regards,
>> --
>> Yves-Alexis
Download attachment "0x5AB2FAF17B172BEA.asc" of type "application/pgp-keys" (6731 bytes)
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