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Message-ID: <20180115163315.GG5534@suse.de>
Date: Mon, 15 Jan 2018 17:33:15 +0100
From: Marcus Meissner <meissner@...e.de>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: transmission: rpc session-id mechanism design
flaw results in RCE
Hi,
Mitre assigned CVE-2018-5702.
Ciao, Marcus
On Thu, Jan 11, 2018 at 10:47:38AM -0800, Tavis Ormandy wrote:
> Hello, the transmission bittorrent client uses a client/server
> architecture, the user interface is the client and a daemon runs in the
> background managing the downloading, seeding, etc.
>
> Clients interact with the daemon using JSON RPC requests to a web server
> listening on port 9091. The daemon will only accept requests from localhost
> by default, but it's common to configure NAS devices to accept remote
> clients.
>
> A sample RPC session looks like this:
>
> $ curl -sI http://localhost:9091/transmission/rpc
> HTTP/1.1 409 Conflict
> Server: Transmission
> X-Transmission-Session-Id: JL641xTn2h53UsN6bVa0kJjRBLA6oX1Ayl06AJwuhHvSgE6H
> Date: Wed, 29 Nov 2017 21:37:41 GMT
>
> $ curl -H 'X-Transmission-Session-Id:
> JL641xTn2h53UsN6bVa0kJjRBLA6oX1Ayl06AJwuhHvSgE6H' -d
> '{"method":"session-set","arguments":{"download-dir":"/home/user"}}' -si
> http://localhost:9091/transmission/rpc
> HTTP/1.1 200 OK
> Server: Transmission
> Content-Type: application/json; charset=UTF-8
> Date: Wed, 29 Nov 2017 21:38:57 GMT
> Content-Length: 36
>
> {"arguments":{},"result":"success"}
>
> As with all HTTP RPC schemes like this, any website can send requests to
> the daemon listening on localhost with XMLHttpRequest(), but the theory is
> they will be ignored because clients must prove they can read and set a
> specific header, X-Transmission-Session-Id.
>
> Unfortunately, this design doesn't work because of an attack called "DNS
> rebinding". Any website can simply create a dns name that they are
> authorized to communicate with, and then make it resolve to localhost.
>
> The attack works like this:
>
> 1. A user visits http://attacker.com, which has an <iframe> to a subdomain
> the attacker controls.
> 2. The attacker configures their DNS server to respond alternately with
> 127.0.0.1 and 123.123.123.123 (an address they control) with a very low TTL.
> 3. When the browser resolves to 123.123.123.123, they serve HTML that waits
> for the DNS entry to expire (or force it to expire by flooding the cache
> with lookups), then they have permission to read and set headers.
>
> I have a domain I use for testing dns rebinding called rbndr.us, you can
> use this page to generate hostnames (source code is here:
> https://github.com/taviso/rbndr):
>
> https://lock.cmpxchg8b.com/rebinder.html
>
> Here I want to alternate between 127.0.0.1 and 199.241.29.227, so I use
> 7f000001.c7f11de3.rbndr.us:
>
> $ host 7f000001.c7f11de3.rbndr.us
> 7f000001.c7f11de3.rbndr.us has address 127.0.0.1
> $ host 7f000001.c7f11de3.rbndr.us
> 7f000001.c7f11de3.rbndr.us has address 199.241.29.227
> $ host 7f000001.c7f11de3.rbndr.us
> 7f000001.c7f11de3.rbndr.us has address 127.0.0.1
>
> Here you can see the resolution alternates between the two addresses I want
> (note that depending on caching it might take a while to switch, the TTL is
> set to minimum but some servers round up).
>
> I just wait for the cached response to expire, and then POST commands to
> the server.
>
> Exploitation is simple, you could set script-torrent-done-enabled and run
> any command, or set download-dir to /home/user/ and then upload a torrent
> for ".bashrc".
>
> Here is my (simple) demo, it's slow, but could be made very fast:
>
> http://lock.cmpxchg8b.com/Asoquu3e.html
>
> I've verified it works on Chrome and Firefox on Windows and Linux (I tried
> Fedora and Ubuntu), I expect other platforms and browsers are affected. There
> are screenshots of how the attack is supposed to look on the bug report
> here:
>
> https://github.com/transmission/transmission/pull/468
>
> Tavis.
> From a82c9d154613a5f99394029c28a01148749735af Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> From: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@...il.com>
> Date: Fri, 1 Dec 2017 12:49:25 -0800
> Subject: [PATCH] mitigate dns rebinding attacks
>
> ---
> libtransmission/quark.c | 2 +
> libtransmission/quark.h | 2 +
> libtransmission/rpc-server.c | 116 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
> libtransmission/rpc-server.h | 4 ++
> libtransmission/session.c | 2 +
> libtransmission/transmission.h | 1 +
> libtransmission/web.c | 3 ++
> 7 files changed, 121 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/libtransmission/quark.c b/libtransmission/quark.c
> index 861050057..87ed9f3ef 100644
> --- a/libtransmission/quark.c
> +++ b/libtransmission/quark.c
> @@ -296,6 +296,8 @@ static struct tr_key_struct const my_static[] =
> { "rpc-version-minimum", 19 },
> { "rpc-whitelist", 13 },
> { "rpc-whitelist-enabled", 21 },
> + { "rpc-host-whitelist", 18 },
> + { "rpc-host-whitelist-enabled", 26 },
> { "scrape", 6 },
> { "scrape-paused-torrents-enabled", 30 },
> { "scrapeState", 11 },
> diff --git a/libtransmission/quark.h b/libtransmission/quark.h
> index d40ab75fa..d82c7051b 100644
> --- a/libtransmission/quark.h
> +++ b/libtransmission/quark.h
> @@ -298,6 +298,8 @@ enum
> TR_KEY_rpc_version_minimum,
> TR_KEY_rpc_whitelist,
> TR_KEY_rpc_whitelist_enabled,
> + TR_KEY_rpc_host_whitelist,
> + TR_KEY_rpc_host_whitelist_enabled,
> TR_KEY_scrape,
> TR_KEY_scrape_paused_torrents_enabled,
> TR_KEY_scrapeState,
> diff --git a/libtransmission/rpc-server.c b/libtransmission/rpc-server.c
> index 7c78f92ac..a33f07e10 100644
> --- a/libtransmission/rpc-server.c
> +++ b/libtransmission/rpc-server.c
> @@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ struct tr_rpc_server
> bool isEnabled;
> bool isPasswordEnabled;
> bool isWhitelistEnabled;
> + bool isHostWhitelistEnabled;
> tr_port port;
> char* url;
> struct tr_address bindAddress;
> @@ -62,6 +63,7 @@ struct tr_rpc_server
> char* password;
> char* whitelistStr;
> tr_list* whitelist;
> + tr_list* hostWhitelist;
> int loginattempts;
>
> bool isStreamInitialized;
> @@ -547,6 +549,47 @@ static bool isAddressAllowed(tr_rpc_server const* server, char const* address)
> return false;
> }
>
> +static bool isHostnameAllowed(tr_rpc_server const* server, struct evhttp_request* req)
> +{
> + const char *host = evhttp_find_header(req->input_headers, "Host");
> + char *hostname;
> +
> + // If password auth is enabled, any hostname is permitted.
> + if (server->isPasswordEnabled)
> + return true;
> +
> + // No host header, invalid request.
> + if (!host)
> + return false;
> +
> + // Host header might include the port.
> + hostname = tr_strndup(host, strcspn(host, ":"));
> +
> + // localhost or ipaddress is always acceptable.
> + if (strcmp(hostname, "localhost") == 0
> + || strcmp(hostname, "localhost.") == 0
> + || tr_addressIsIP(hostname))
> + {
> + tr_free(hostname);
> + return true;
> + }
> +
> + // Otherwise, hostname must be whitelisted.
> + if (server->isHostWhitelistEnabled)
> + {
> + for (tr_list* l = server->hostWhitelist; l != NULL; l = l->next) {
> + if (tr_wildmat(hostname, l->data))
> + {
> + tr_free(hostname);
> + return true;
> + }
> + }
> + }
> +
> + tr_free(hostname);
> + return false;
> +}
> +
> static bool test_session_id(struct tr_rpc_server* server, struct evhttp_request* req)
> {
> char const* ours = get_current_session_id(server);
> @@ -636,6 +679,22 @@ static void handle_request(struct evhttp_request* req, void* arg)
>
> #ifdef REQUIRE_SESSION_ID
>
> + else if (!isHostnameAllowed(server, req))
> + {
> + char* tmp = tr_strdup_printf(
> + "<p>Transmission received your request, but the hostname was unrecognized.</p>"
> + "<p>To fix this, choose one of the following options:"
> + "<ul>"
> + "<li>Enable password authentication, then any hostname is allowed.</li>"
> + "<li>Add the hostname you want to use to the whitelist in settings.</li>"
> + "</ul></p>"
> + "<p>If you're editing settings.json, see the 'rpc-host-whitelist' and 'rpc-host-whitelist-enabled' entries.</p>"
> + "<p>This requirement has been added to help prevent "
> + "<a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_rebinding\">DNS Rebinding</a> "
> + "attacks.</p>");
> + send_simple_response(req, 421, tmp);
> + tr_free(tmp);
> + }
> else if (!test_session_id(server, req))
> {
> char const* sessionId = get_current_session_id(server);
> @@ -647,7 +706,7 @@ static void handle_request(struct evhttp_request* req, void* arg)
> "<li> When you get this 409 error message, resend your request with the updated header"
> "</ol></p>"
> "<p>This requirement has been added to help prevent "
> - "<a href=\"http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-site_request_forgery\">CSRF</a> "
> + "<a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-site_request_forgery\">CSRF</a> "
> "attacks.</p>"
> "<p><code>%s: %s</code></p>",
> TR_RPC_SESSION_ID_HEADER, sessionId);
> @@ -844,17 +903,12 @@ char const* tr_rpcGetUrl(tr_rpc_server const* server)
> return server->url != NULL ? server->url : "";
> }
>
> -void tr_rpcSetWhitelist(tr_rpc_server* server, char const* whitelistStr)
> +static void tr_rpcSetList(char const* whitelistStr, tr_list** list)
> {
> void* tmp;
>
> - /* keep the string */
> - tmp = server->whitelistStr;
> - server->whitelistStr = tr_strdup(whitelistStr);
> - tr_free(tmp);
> -
> /* clear out the old whitelist entries */
> - while ((tmp = tr_list_pop_front(&server->whitelist)) != NULL)
> + while ((tmp = tr_list_pop_front(list)) != NULL)
> {
> tr_free(tmp);
> }
> @@ -866,7 +920,7 @@ void tr_rpcSetWhitelist(tr_rpc_server* server, char const* whitelistStr)
> size_t const len = strcspn(walk, delimiters);
> char* token = tr_strndup(walk, len);
>
> - tr_list_append(&server->whitelist, token);
> + tr_list_append(list, token);
>
> if (strcspn(token, "+-") < len)
> {
> @@ -889,6 +943,23 @@ void tr_rpcSetWhitelist(tr_rpc_server* server, char const* whitelistStr)
> }
> }
>
> +void tr_rpcSetHostWhitelist(tr_rpc_server* server, char const* whitelistStr)
> +{
> + tr_rpcSetList(whitelistStr, &server->hostWhitelist);
> +}
> +
> +void tr_rpcSetWhitelist(tr_rpc_server* server, char const* whitelistStr)
> +{
> + void* tmp;
> +
> + /* keep the string */
> + tmp = server->whitelistStr;
> + server->whitelistStr = tr_strdup(whitelistStr);
> + tr_free(tmp);
> +
> + tr_rpcSetList(whitelistStr, &server->whitelist);
> +}
> +
> char const* tr_rpcGetWhitelist(tr_rpc_server const* server)
> {
> return server->whitelistStr != NULL ? server->whitelistStr : "";
> @@ -904,6 +975,11 @@ bool tr_rpcGetWhitelistEnabled(tr_rpc_server const* server)
> return server->isWhitelistEnabled;
> }
>
> +void tr_rpcSetHostWhitelistEnabled(tr_rpc_server* server, bool isEnabled)
> +{
> + server->isHostWhitelistEnabled = isEnabled;
> +}
> +
> /****
> ***** PASSWORD
> ****/
> @@ -1054,6 +1130,28 @@ tr_rpc_server* tr_rpcInit(tr_session* session, tr_variant* settings)
> tr_rpcSetWhitelistEnabled(s, boolVal);
> }
>
> + key = TR_KEY_rpc_host_whitelist_enabled;
> +
> + if (!tr_variantDictFindBool(settings, key, &boolVal))
> + {
> + missing_settings_key(key);
> + }
> + else
> + {
> + tr_rpcSetHostWhitelistEnabled(s, boolVal);
> + }
> +
> + key = TR_KEY_rpc_host_whitelist;
> +
> + if (!tr_variantDictFindStr(settings, key, &str, NULL) && str != NULL)
> + {
> + missing_settings_key(key);
> + }
> + else
> + {
> + tr_rpcSetHostWhitelist(s, str);
> + }
> +
> key = TR_KEY_rpc_authentication_required;
>
> if (!tr_variantDictFindBool(settings, key, &boolVal))
> diff --git a/libtransmission/rpc-server.h b/libtransmission/rpc-server.h
> index 46e8a871f..ad1eb5204 100644
> --- a/libtransmission/rpc-server.h
> +++ b/libtransmission/rpc-server.h
> @@ -42,6 +42,10 @@ void tr_rpcSetWhitelist(tr_rpc_server* server, char const* whitelist);
>
> char const* tr_rpcGetWhitelist(tr_rpc_server const* server);
>
> +void tr_rpcSetHostWhitelistEnabled(tr_rpc_server* server, bool isEnabled);
> +
> +void tr_rpcSetHostWhitelist(tr_rpc_server* server, char const* whitelist);
> +
> void tr_rpcSetPassword(tr_rpc_server* server, char const* password);
>
> char const* tr_rpcGetPassword(tr_rpc_server const* server);
> diff --git a/libtransmission/session.c b/libtransmission/session.c
> index 86d054f7f..9a0b7c104 100644
> --- a/libtransmission/session.c
> +++ b/libtransmission/session.c
> @@ -371,6 +371,8 @@ void tr_sessionGetDefaultSettings(tr_variant* d)
> tr_variantDictAddStr(d, TR_KEY_rpc_username, "");
> tr_variantDictAddStr(d, TR_KEY_rpc_whitelist, TR_DEFAULT_RPC_WHITELIST);
> tr_variantDictAddBool(d, TR_KEY_rpc_whitelist_enabled, true);
> + tr_variantDictAddStr(d, TR_KEY_rpc_host_whitelist, TR_DEFAULT_RPC_HOST_WHITELIST);
> + tr_variantDictAddBool(d, TR_KEY_rpc_host_whitelist_enabled, true);
> tr_variantDictAddInt(d, TR_KEY_rpc_port, atoi(TR_DEFAULT_RPC_PORT_STR));
> tr_variantDictAddStr(d, TR_KEY_rpc_url, TR_DEFAULT_RPC_URL_STR);
> tr_variantDictAddBool(d, TR_KEY_scrape_paused_torrents_enabled, true);
> diff --git a/libtransmission/transmission.h b/libtransmission/transmission.h
> index ac1871adb..08a24eca4 100644
> --- a/libtransmission/transmission.h
> +++ b/libtransmission/transmission.h
> @@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ char const* tr_getDefaultDownloadDir(void);
> #define TR_DEFAULT_BIND_ADDRESS_IPV4 "0.0.0.0"
> #define TR_DEFAULT_BIND_ADDRESS_IPV6 "::"
> #define TR_DEFAULT_RPC_WHITELIST "127.0.0.1,::1"
> +#define TR_DEFAULT_RPC_HOST_WHITELIST ""
> #define TR_DEFAULT_RPC_PORT_STR "9091"
> #define TR_DEFAULT_RPC_URL_STR "/transmission/"
> #define TR_DEFAULT_PEER_PORT_STR "51413"
> diff --git a/libtransmission/web.c b/libtransmission/web.c
> index cca888b66..a57c85457 100644
> --- a/libtransmission/web.c
> +++ b/libtransmission/web.c
> @@ -678,6 +678,9 @@ char const* tr_webGetResponseStr(long code)
> case 417:
> return "Expectation Failed";
>
> + case 421:
> + return "Misdirected Request";
> +
> case 500:
> return "Internal Server Error";
>
> --
> 2.15.0.531.g2ccb3012c9-goog
>
--
Marcus Meissner,SUSE LINUX GmbH; Maxfeldstrasse 5; D-90409 Nuernberg; Zi. 3.1-33,+49-911-740 53-432,,serv=loki,mail=wotan,type=real <meissner@...e.de>
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