|
Message-ID: <20171107205823.qlkj6tdo5rnriuno@jwilk.net> Date: Tue, 7 Nov 2017 21:58:23 +0100 From: Jakub Wilk <jwilk@...lk.net> To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com Subject: Re: Fw: Security risk of vim swap files * Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@...onical.com>, 2017-11-06, 15:09: >Is it not the kernel's responsibility to enforce umask(2) is properly >applied? Yes, most programs don't have to care about this. >Obviously there's good case to be made that manual chmod(2) calls could >or should be modified by umask(2) values by hand, but probably all >those chmod(2) calls ought to be re-written to set the modes correctly >at file creation time (or mkdir, etc) to avoid race conditions. vim creates the swapfile initially with mode 0600, and later chmods it. There's no race condition. -- Jakub Wilk
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Please check out the Open Source Software Security Wiki, which is counterpart to this mailing list.
Confused about mailing lists and their use? Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia and check out these guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.