|
Message-ID: <1496149413.941.3.camel@gmail.com> Date: Tue, 30 May 2017 09:03:33 -0400 From: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com> To: Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>, oss-security@...ts.openwall.com Cc: Roee Hay <roeehay@...il.com> Subject: Re: Linux kernel: stack buffer overflow with controlled payload in get_options() function On Tue, 2017-05-30 at 14:52 +0200, Florian Weimer wrote: > On 05/30/2017 01:51 PM, Daniel Micay wrote: > > It's unreasonable to consider the kernel line untrusted. A CVE being > > issued for one of these issues didn't make sense. > > It's a potential Secure Boot bypass, so it matters in some theoretical > sense to some downstreams which carry those Secure Boot patches. Also not sure what you mean by patches. Secure boot doesn't require applying patches. The kernel has to be verified by an early boot chain and dm-verity is in mainline for verifying the rest of the OS as Android and ChromeOS do. Android does have some tweaks for dm-verity but they're workarounds for bureaucracy rather than true technical requirements.
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Please check out the Open Source Software Security Wiki, which is counterpart to this mailing list.
Confused about mailing lists and their use? Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia and check out these guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.